What Makes a Crime Against Humanity a Crime Against Humanity by Jalloh, Charles Chernor
  
 
381 
ARTICLES 
WHAT MAKES A CRIME AGAINST 
HUMANITY A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY 
CHARLES CHERNOR JALLOH* 
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 382 
II. ORIGINS OF THE STATE OR ORGANIZATIONAL 
POLICY REQUIREMENT ....................................................... 391 
A. EARLY DEFINITIONAL CHALLENGES ...................................... 391 
B. THE ROAD TO HEAVEN IS PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS: 
ELIMINATING THE STATE POLICY REQUIREMENT IN THE 
ICTY AND ICTR .................................................................. 396 
III. THE UNCERTAIN CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
LAW STATUS OF THE STATE OR ORGANIZATIONAL 
POLICY REQUIREMENT ....................................................... 402 
A. PROSECUTIONS OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN 
NATIONAL COURTS .............................................................. 402 
B. THE SLOW EVOLUTION OF A CLEAR CRIMES AGAINST 
HUMANITY DEFINITION AT THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
COMMISSION ........................................................................ 405 
 
* B.A. (Guelph), LL.B., B.C.L. (McGill), M.St. and Chevening Scholar (Oxford); 
Assistant Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Pennsylvania, United 
States of America; former Visiting Professional, International Criminal Court; 
Legal Advisor to the Office of the Principal Defender, Special Court for Sierra 
Leone; Associate Legal Officer, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda; and 
Legal Counsel, Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Section, Canadian 
Department of Justice. E-mail: jallohc@gmail.com. Many thanks to Dapo Akande, 
Alexander (Sasha) Greenawalt, Larry Helfer, Maximo Langer, and Ingrid Wuerth 
as well as the various other participants in the 2012 International Legal Studies 
Roundtable at Vanderbilt Law School for their helpful comments on the draft. I am 
especially grateful to Ingrid Wuerth for inviting me to her excellent event, and to 
Larry May for his incisive comments as discussant. Darryl Robinson provided 
excellent comments on an earlier draft for which I am much indebted. I also thank 
Cindy Giehart and her dedicated editorial team for their hard work. Kirk Knutson 
provided outstanding research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies. 
  
382 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:2 
IV. THE STATE OR ORGANIZATIONAL POLICY 
REQUIREMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT CASE LAW ................................................................ 408 
A. JUDICIAL DISSENSION IN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
COURT .................................................................................. 408 
B. THE MEANING OF “STATE” AND “STATE POLICY” ................. 421 
C. THE MEANING OF “ORGANIZATION” AND 
“ORGANIZATIONAL POLICY” ................................................ 428 
V. CONCLUSION........................................................................... 435 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Despite extensive debates surrounding the scope of the contextual 
element of crimes against humanity during the 1998 negotiations 
leading up to the formal establishment of the permanent International 
Criminal Court (ICC), the meaning of the so-called State or 
organizational policy requirement contained in Article 7(2)(a) of the 
Rome Statute remains unsettled over a decade later.1 The origins of 
this ambiguity can be traced to its earliest legal use in the Nuremberg 
International Military Tribunal immediately after World War II, and 
the corresponding vagueness of its subsequent interpretation and 
uncertain status in customary international law.2 This lack of clarity 
has persisted throughout the more recent history of international 
criminal law. 
Part of the problem is that, unlike the crime of genocide, which has 
a widely accepted definition in the 1948 Genocide Convention, or war 
crimes, which are codified in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their 
additional protocols, there is no single treaty addressing crimes against 
 
 1. See Darryl Robinson, The Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF 
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 57, 57–80 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001) (detailing the 
concerns of States Parties during the course of negotiations on language pertaining 
to crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute and the ICC’s Elements of 
Crimes). 
 2. See Larissa van den Herik & Elies van Sliedregt, Removing or 
Reincarnating the Policy Requirement of Crimes Against Humanity: An 
Introductory Note, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 825 (2010) (highlighting that “[o]f the 
three existing core crimes in international criminal law, crimes against humanity is 
the most elusive one, a chameleonic crime that can change colour over time, since 
it does not possess an unambiguous conceptual character.”). 
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humanity.3 Thus, despite the centrality of the offense to modern 
international prosecution efforts,4 various definitions of the crime and 
its contextual and other elements have been developed and used in 
different national5 and international6 contexts over the years.  
 
 3. See FORGING A CONVENTION FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (Leila N. 
Sadat ed., 2011) (presenting a Proposed International Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Humanity, along with a number of 
related academic articles, based on the collaboration of some 250 scholars). It is 
only recently that an attempt has been made to codify crimes against humanity in a 
single convention. While a significant step forward, this effort was undertaken by 
leading experts, not by States. It is hoped that the instrument will at least serve as a 
template for a convention and that States will eventually see the light and adopt a 
crimes against humanity treaty. Id. 
 4. See Leila N. Sadat, Emerging from the Shadow of Nuremberg: Crimes 
Against Humanity in the Modern Age, WASH. UNIV. IN ST. LOUIS SCH. OF LAW, at 
16–18 (Wash. Univ. in St. Louis Legal Studies Paper Ser. No. 11-11-04, 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2013254 
(observing that only a “handful” of States, most notably Israel and France, have 
incorporated crimes against humanity into their domestic law, while prosecutions 
for crimes against humanity have been highly significant in the work of the recent 
international tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, East 
Timor, and Cambodia). 
 5. See, e.g., Attorney General of Israel v. Demjanjuk, Trial Judgment, District 
Court of Jerusalem (Apr. 18, 1988); CrimA 347/88, Demjanjuk v. State of Israel, 
Isr. SC 221 (1993); Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, Trial Judgment, 
District Court of Jerusalem (Dec. 12, 1961); Appeals Judgment, Supreme Court of 
Israel (May 29, 1962); Nazis and Nazi Collaborators -Punishment- Law- 5710-
1950, ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA 
Archive/1950_1959/Nazis%20and%20Nazi%20Collaborators%20-Punishment-% 
20Law-%20571 (last visited Sept. 30, 2012) (defining crimes against humanity as 
“any of the following acts: murder, extermination, enslavement, starvation or 
deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, 
and persecution on national, racial, religious or political grounds”). 
 6. See, e.g., Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 2, Jan. 16, 2002, 
http://www.sc-sl.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=uClnd1MJeEw%3d&tabid=176 
(giving the Special Court power to prosecute individuals responsible for murder; 
extermination; enslavement; deportation; imprisonment; torture; rape sexual 
slavery, forced prostitution or pregnancy, or other form of sexual violence; 
political, racial, or religious persecution; and “other inhumane acts” in the course 
of a “widespread or systematic attack” against a civilian population); Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 3, Nov. 6, 1994, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/955 [hereinafter ICTR Statute] (empowering the Tribunal to prosecute 
persons responsible for murder; extermination enslavement; deportation; 
imprisonment; torture; rape; political, racial, or religious persecution; and “other 
inhumane acts” in the course of a “widespread or systematic attack” against a 
civilian population based on nationality, politics, ethnicity, race, or religion); 
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 5, 
May 25, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 [hereinafter ICTY Statute] (granting the 
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Another problem is that, although crimes against humanity are a 
core part of the Rome Statute, there appears to be a lack of 
conceptual consensus on what makes a crime against humanity a 
crime against humanity as opposed to a common offense under 
domestic law. The predominant view, at least in the ICC formulation 
of the crime, requires the commission of certain underlying 
prohibited acts such as murder or rape as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against any civilian population. The 
multiple commissions of the impugned acts against civilians will 
give rise to crimes against humanity when carried out pursuant to, or 
in furtherance of, a State or organizational policy.  
But even the Rome Statute definition does not resolve the 
problem. For example, Professor Darryl Robinson has identified 
about four theories associated with the State or organizational policy 
requirement that serve as a key component of the ICC definition of 
the offense.7 The starting point is the plain textual requirement that 
there must be a State policy to commit the attacks. That said, he 
shows that some scholars argue that no policy element is required, 
while others insist that there must be a policy.8 Similarly, regarding 
the organizational aspect, some theorists claim that in the absence of 
a State policy there must be an organization, but only a “State-like” 
organization having some type of policy would qualify.9 Finally, 
there is the even broader pro–human rights suggestion that crimes 
against humanity should encompass any entity with the capacity to 
 
Tribunal power to prosecute individuals responsible for murder; extermination; 
enslavement; deportation; imprisonment; torture; rape; political, racial, or religious 
persecution; and “other inhumane acts” directed against a civilian population 
during an armed conflict); G.A. Res. 57/228, ¶ 5, U.N. DOC. A/RES/57/228 
(Dec. 18, 2002) (referring to “crimes against humanity committed during the 
regime of Democratic Kampuchea”); UNTAET, On the Amendment of UNTAET 
Regulation No.2000/11 on the Organization of Courts in East Timor and UNTAET 
Regulation No.2000/30 on the Transitional Rules of Criminal Procedure, § 9, U.N. 
Doc. UNTAET/REG/2001/25 (Sep. 14, 2001) (granting the East Timor District 
Court in Dili exclusive jurisdiction to try crimes against humanity, not further 
defined, committed between Jan. 1 and Oct. 25, 1999). 
 7. Darryl Robinson, Essence of Crimes Against Humanity Raised at ICC, 
BLOG OF THE EUR. J. OF INT’L L. (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.ejiltalk.org/essence-
of-crimes-against-humanity-raised-by-challenges-at-icc (drawing the theories from 
the text of the Rome Statute, recent ICC cases relating to violence in Kenya, the 
jurisprudence of international tribunals, and scholarly literature). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
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carry out crimes against humanity.10 The latter category would 
presumably include some of the judges at the ICC who have 
advanced, in a seminal decision that will be discussed later, the so-
called Basic Human Values Test as the determinative criterion for 
the classification of a prohibited act as a crime against humanity.  
As Professor Margaret deGuzman has rightly observed, “because 
of its disorganized history, important normative and doctrinal 
questions remain unanswered” about this offense.11 Indeed, as she 
rightly noted, “the context required to qualify an inhumane act as 
crimes against humanity is subject to considerable controversy.”12 
She went on to uncover several normative visions competing with 
each other as rationales purporting to explain the categorization 
crimes against humanity: as addressing a threat to international peace 
and security, gravity and the conscience of humanity, State 
involvement and action, and as prohibition in respect of group-based 
harm.13  
In other words, despite its frequent invocation in contemporary 
legal and popular discourse, it is not entirely clear what is the 
distinguishing characteristic or feature of a crime against humanity 
that moves it from the realm of the domestic to the international, 
such that its commission would attract the interest and condemnation 
of the international community as a whole. Is it because of State or 
organizational involvement in perpetrating or condoning the 
underlying heinous acts? Or is it the widespread or systematic scale 
of the attacks against ordinary civilians that constitutes such an 
affront to human dignity that catapults the offense into the 
stratosphere of crimes against all of humanity? Perhaps it is the 
combination of each of these factors that gives the crime its essential 
character and transforms the entirety of humanity into victims? 
This article does not propose to offer a full-blown theory to 
 
 10. See id. (favoring such an approach over the “State-like” organization theory 
for its flexibility of potential applications in the still-developing doctrine of crimes 
against humanity). 
 11. Margaret M. deGuzman, Crimes Against Humanity, in ROUTLEDGE 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 121, 121 (William A. Schabas & 
Nadia Bernaz eds., 2011). 
 12. Id. at 121.  
 13. Id. at 127−30. 
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respond to these fundamental questions—as others have done.14 
Instead, its goal is more modest in seeking to contribute to the 
nascent debate on these and related issues by, firstly, exposing the 
curious lack of a consensus theory for the international offense that 
has such a simple label that it easily captures the popular imagination 
and, secondly, highlighting the difficulties that the absence of a 
common conceptual mooring poses for status quo definitions of the 
crime and its interpretation and application by judges.  
The paper does so by focusing on the State or organizational 
policy requirement as a contextual element of crimes against 
humanity, as set out in Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute. I examine 
this issue for several reasons. First, although the ICC’s seminal first 
trial in the Thomas Lubanga case was based on war crimes instead of 
crimes against humanity, there is a growing and important body of 
jurisprudence from the various chambers of the Court fleshing out 
the meaning of crimes against humanity. A review of the case law 
discussion of the chapeau elements of that offense, in particular the 
origins of the controversial State or organizational policy 
requirement, allows us to take stock of where we are in terms of the 
practical application of this novel body of Rome Law to concrete 
ICC situations and cases. This becomes even more important 
because, compared to war crimes and genocide, crimes against 
humanity is the broadest and so far only residual offense available in 
the category of so-called “core international crimes.” 
Second, while there is a respectable body of literature on the 
debate, significance, and ambiguities in the definition of crimes 
against humanity agreed to by States during the Rome Statute 
negotiations,15 there is a relatively sparse body of published works 
 
 14. See, e.g., David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. 
INT’L L., Winter 2004, at 85, 90 (arguing, after locating five key characteristics of 
crimes against humanity, that what sets crimes against humanity apart from other 
international crimes is that it represents politics gone horribly wrong). 
 15. E.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW chs. 5, 7 (2d ed. 1999); Margaret de Guzman, Crimes Against 
Humanity, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 121 
(William A. Schabas & Nadia Bernaz eds., 2011); Simon Chesterman, An 
Altogether Different Order: Defining the Elements of Crimes Against Humanity in 
the Rome Statute, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 307 (2000); Phyllis Hwang, 
Defining Crimes Against Humanity in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 457 (1998); Guénaël Mettraux, Crimes 
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assessing exclusively whether or not the judges of the Court are 
interpreting the crime in the manner in which States mandated them 
to do in Article 7 of the ICC treaty.16 Ten years after the Rome 
Statute’s entry into force, it seems timely to make such an 
evaluation. 
Third, at the heart of the recent debates about the State or 
organizational policy requirement in the Rome Statute are differing 
conceptions of the origins, rationale, and ultimate future of 
international criminal law—as would be applied by the ICC, its 121 
States Parties as of the time of this writing, as well as by national 
criminal jurisdictions. The latter are, of course, especially important 
because they are supposed to incorporate the treaty into their national 
laws, thereby supplying the legal framework to act as the first lines 
of defense against impunity.  
Fourth is a pressing question that will probably demand an answer 
as the ICC regime evolves alongside, and as part of, a broader and 
deeper international peace and security architecture. That is: how 
might we transpose the classic definition of crimes against humanity, 
frozen as it is in the State-centered logic of the interstate World War 
II conflict context, and apply it to the modern non-State actor-driven 
conflicts? This appears particularly significant given the increasing 
 
Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunals for 
the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 237, 278–82, 285 n.247 
(2002); Darryl Robinson, Defining “Crimes Against Humanity” at the Rome 
Conference, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 43 (1999); Beth Van Schaack, The Definition of 
Crimes Against Humanity: Resolving the Incoherence, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L 
L. 787, 841–46, 850 (1999). 
 16. See, e.g., LARRY MAY, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A NORMATIVE 
ACCOUNT (2004); Claus Kress, On the Outer Limits of Crimes Against Humanity: 
The Concept of Organization Within the Policy Requirement: Some Reflections of 
the March 2010 ICC Kenya Decision, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 855, 861 (2010); Matt 
Halling, Push the Envelope—Watch It Bend: Removing the Policy Requirement 
and Extending Crimes Against Humanity, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 827 (2010); 
William A. Schabas, Prosecuting Dr. Strangelove, Goldfinger, and the Joker at the 
International Criminal Court: Closing the Loopholes, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 847 
(2010); Thomas O. Hansen, The Policy Requirement in Crimes Against Humanity: 
Lessons from and for the Case of Kenya, 43 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1 (2011); 
Sadat, supra note 4; Robinson, Essence of Crimes Against Humanity Raised at 
ICC, supra note 7; Guénaël Mettraux, The Definition of Crimes Against Humanity 
and the Question of a “Policy” Element, in FORGING A CONVENTION, supra note 3, 
at 142 (2011); Charles C. Jalloh, Case Report: Situation in the Republic of Kenya, 
105 AM. J. INT’L L. 540 (2011). 
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recognition among scholars of the need to resuscitate jus post bellum 
(i.e., justice after war), as a foundational third pillar, to supplement 
the traditional jus ad bellum (when it is just to use force) and jus in 
bello (how it is just to fight in war). Indeed, given the international 
community’s human rights–driven preoccupation with ascribing 
individual criminal responsibility for the top wrongdoers who foment 
mass crimes, it seems much more necessary to establish a firm 
structural foundation for long-term peace in the aftermath of conflict 
and mass atrocity.  
In this regard, Professor Larry May has rightly suggested, for 
instance, that it is nowadays imperative to reestablish a rule of law 
that gives pride of place to protecting human rights, so as to create a 
just peace after war ends.17 A just peace is simply impossible if a 
measure of justice is not meted out to at least those deemed to bear 
the greatest responsibility for the mass crimes committed in a given 
conflict. The concern with whether crimes against humanity ought to 
be redefined or at least tweaked to meet the pressing challenges of 
the twenty-first century, as opposed to those of the twentieth century, 
would thus seem consistent with the centrality of the idea of more 
prosecutions to the second of May’s six proposed normative 
principles for a jus post bellum system. Under his principle of 
retribution, the top layer responsible for gross human rights 
violations should either be prosecuted within the national 
jurisdiction, or be extradited to international penal tribunals.18 He 
assumes prosecutions as a given for the persons properly indicted by 
the latter courts, carving out only a limited non-prosecution 
exception in circumstances where, on balance, it can be 
demonstrated that indicting or prosecuting a particular leader would 
adversely affect human rights protection.19  
Other scholars hold similar views. For example, Professor Brian 
Orend, even as he cautioned us to think of the justice in a jus post 
bellum setting in a richer way than the traditional just war theory 
approach limiting it solely to the trial and punishment of war 
criminals, has also suggested that at least the leaders of aggressor 
 
 17. LARRY MAY, AFTER WAR ENDS: A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE 16 
(2012). 
 18. Id. pt. 1. 
 19. Id. at 31–32. 
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rights-violating regimes ought to be tried in fair, public, and 
international trials.20 He essentially used deterrence, rehabilitation, 
retribution, and related theories of punishment to further justify why 
all the soldiers from different sides to an armed conflict ought to be 
investigated and prosecuted.21 His argument, especially when 
connected with his excellent proposal for a Geneva Convention 
regulating post-war justice matters, reflects a current trajectory 
emphasizing the greater individual criminal responsibility that we see 
for certain situations in modern international criminal justice 
discourse. It therefore appears to bolster my proposal for an 
expanded definition or understanding of crimes against humanity in 
the world’s only permanent international criminal tribunal, which has 
a crucial role to play in that regard.  
For his part, Professor Carsten Stahn, in making a compelling case 
for the acknowledgement of an explicit body of “post-conflict law” 
to guide post-conflict peace arrangements, has sketched out six 
starting principles in an important article.22 He linked two of those 
rules—the norm of individual criminal responsibility and the creation 
of criminal justice and reconciliation mechanisms—to an increasing 
practice of the international community.23 Another goal of this article 
then is to help build an explicit link between these recent jus post 
bellum discussions to how crimes against humanity are defined, 
interpreted, and applied to concrete situations and cases in the ICC. 
This is important because it essentially affects the range and reach of 
the primary international institution that virtually all the mentioned 
theorists, as well as many others, agree should be supported to ensure 
the crucial individual criminal accountability component is available 
and deployable in any modern post-conflict justice dispensation 
within its jurisdiction.  
More specifically, in this article I will attempt to show that, by 
narrowly limiting crimes against humanity for the purposes of ICC 
prosecutions through the establishment of the State or organizational 
 
 20. Brian Orend, Jus Post Bellum: The Perspective of a Just War Theorist, 20 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 571, 574. 591 (2007).  
 21. Id. at 580. 
 22. Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus ad Bellum’, ‘Jus in Bello’, . . . ‘Jus post Bellum’? 
Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 921, 
938 (2006). 
 23. Id. at 937–38. 
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policy as the key trigger for the offense, the international community 
might have chosen to give a free pass to the many who could 
otherwise be prosecutable if we had defined the crime more broadly 
by focusing on the gravity and scale of the human rights violations 
and their devastating impact on the victims. If this hunch is correct, 
the effect appears perverse because it may exclude common types of 
modern violence by non-State actors who do not exhibit any apparent 
State or organizational policy links. This undermines the objectives 
of enhancing human rights protection through prosecutions and 
perhaps even the presumed deterrence and retributive value of 
international criminal law. It straightjackets crimes against humanity 
in such a way that the prospects for prosecuting the most responsible 
leaders are dimmed. In turn, that diminishes the likelihood that we 
will achieve accountability and a just and sustainable peace in 
conflict-post-conflict societies. 
As part of a close review of the ICC case law, I will show that 
there is a split in the interpretations offered by two main judicial 
camps at the ICC. The first camp is the majority view in a series of 
decisions primarily arising from the Kenya Situation, which offered a 
broad interpretation of crimes against humanity, while a second and 
relatively narrower conception, was offered by a lone but powerful 
dissenter. As each of the two approaches seems equally plausible, 
and therefore equally defensible, I suggest that the ICC should make 
a policy choice on which understanding to embrace, as each 
interpretive stance carries significant implications for the Court’s 
caseload and equally significant implications for the obligations of 
its States Parties.  
The question that then arises is who must make that policy 
decision. I argue that while it is acceptable for the judges to decide, 
and they have done so by default through the dominant position that 
has emerged in the case law, given the implications of a broader 
jurisdictional coverage for the Court, it is more pragmatic, more 
defensible, and ultimately more legitimate for the choice to be made 
by the States Parties to the Rome Statute through a formal 
amendment of the current crimes against humanity definition.  
As a preliminary matter, I recognize that some will likely object 
that the ICC does not need an expanded crimes against humanity 
jurisdiction to cover non-State actors, lest it be overwhelmed by a 
  
2013] WHAT MAKES A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY 391 
flood of situations and cases, especially given its finite resources. Yet 
others might counter that my call for a statutory amendment at this 
relatively early stage of the Court’s life, when it is only ten years old, 
is perhaps somewhat premature. This is all the more so because we 
are yet to have any successful crimes against humanity prosecutions 
from the ICC.  
But such objections would ignore the fact that States themselves 
provided a mechanism for amendments to the Rome Statute crimes 
only seven years after its entry into force under Article 121. Further, 
given that I consider the Court is at a crossroads regarding what 
interpretive direction to take crimes against humanity and perhaps 
even the ICC itself, I believe that the proposed amendment, while not 
the ideal solution, is the better one in the range of choices that the 
Court currently faces. It, in any event, seems infinitely better than a 
judicially led change, because it takes the heat of criticism away 
from the judges who will face allegations of judicial activism and 
would certainly enjoy greater legitimacy than reliance on the works 
of select scholars.  
This article is organized as follows. Part II examines the origins of 
the State or organizational policy requirement at Nuremberg and the 
narrow conception of crimes against humanity it advanced. Part III 
turns to the uncertain customary international law status of the ad 
hoc international tribunal conclusion that no such policy is required 
for proof of the existence of crimes against humanity. Part IV 
considers the relevant ICC jurisprudence to show the way the judges 
have to date interpreted the State or organizational policy 
requirement in the Rome Statute. The article concludes with a 
tentative assessment of what my amendment proposal implies for the 
ICC in particular and international criminal law more broadly.  
II. ORIGINS OF THE STATE OR 
ORGANIZATIONAL POLICY REQUIREMENT 
A. EARLY DEFINITIONAL CHALLENGES 
The lack of clarity in customary international law about the proper 
scope of crimes against humanity has persisted since 1915, when 
Russia, Britain, and the United States issued a joint statement 
condemning the “crimes of Turkey against humanity and 
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civilization” committed during the Armenian genocide.24 This 
language has been traced to the Martens Clause of the Convention on 
the Law and Customs of War on Land (Hague II), which referred to 
the “laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.”25  
Following the Armenian genocide, the governments allied in 
World War I signed the Treaty of Sevres. While that treaty would 
have required the Ottoman Empire to assist in the arrest and 
prosecution of those responsible for these crimes, it was never 
ratified, and no international prosecution of the perpetrators of the 
Armenian genocide ever occurred.26 The absence of an effective 
international penal response to those crimes thus limited the 
significance of the phrase to an acknowledgement that customary 
international law arguably recognized certain crimes against 
humanity, though not explicitly called as such, while also leaving the 
substantive content of the crime unclear. 
Although there were several other developments along the way, 
most notably within the framework of the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission created in London on October 20, 1943, it was 
not until the establishment of the International Military Tribunal 
(“IMT”) at Nuremberg in 1945 that a clear legal specification of 
crimes against humanity began to take shape. Although it furnished a 
basic definition of the offense, the IMT failed to clarify its exact 
scope.27 The Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT 
 
 24. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 101–02 (2d ed. 2008) 
(noting that the originally proposed formulation was “crimes against Christianity,” 
rather than “humanity,” but that the three countries went with the latter term 
mainly out of sensitivity to Turkey’s Muslim population). 
 25. Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II) pmbl., July 29, 1899, 32 
Stat. 1803, 1805, T.S. No. 403. 
 26. See Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Turkey 
Signed at Sèvres arts. 228, 230, Aug. 10, 1920, reprinted in TREATIES OF PEACE 
1919–1923 787, 862–63 (Lawrence Martin comp., 1924) (referring to “massacres 
committed during the continuance of the state of war” on the territory of the former 
Turkish Empire); A.E. Montgomery, The Making of the Treaty of Sèvres, 15 HIST. 
J. 775 (1972) (finding that the treaty failed not only due to the rebellion leading to 
the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, but also to conflicting interests 
among the European Allies). 
 27. See Hwang, supra note 15, at 460 (pointing out that because the Tribunal 
prosecuted other offenses alongside crimes against humanity, it did not, for 
example, differentiate the latter from war crimes or define the term “any civilian 
population”). 
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Charter) established the laws and procedures to be followed in that 
ad hoc special court.28 In addition to setting out the elements for 
crimes against peace and war crimes—the other two offenses within 
the tribunal’s subject matter jurisdiction—Article VI(c) of the IMT 
Charter defined crimes against humanity as follows: 
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane 
acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, 
or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or 
in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated.29  
The absence of a specific policy requirement in the IMT Charter 
definition can most plausibly be attributed to the fact that a State plan 
or policy was a basic underlying presumption of all the prosecutions 
at Nuremberg, since the crimes involved were inextricably linked to 
the Nazi state itself.30 Indeed, as various scholars such as Professor 
William Schabas have rightly observed, the chapeau of Article VI of 
the IMT Charter specifically gave the special tribunal competence to 
try and punish the persons who committed crimes against peace, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity, while acting “in the interests of 
the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members 
of organizations.”31  
A year later, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
enacted the core elements of the IMT Charter as the basis for 
prosecuting Japanese leaders responsible for atrocities committed 
during the war.32 These prosecutions were patterned on the same 
logic as that for Germany’s trials. They included very few counts of 
crimes against humanity in the indictment based on the same 
definition created at Nuremberg, albeit with some minor changes.33 
 
 28. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of 
the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. 
 29. Id. 82 U.N.T.S. at 288 (emphasis added). 
 30. William A. Schabas, State Policy as an Element of International Crimes, 
98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 953, 961–62 (2008). 
 31. Id. at 961. 
 32. Establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the Far East art. 1, 
Jan. 19, 1946, TIAS 1589, 4 Bevans 20. 
 33. See id. art. 5(c), 4 Bevans at 23 (leaving out religious grounds for 
persecution and adding that “[l]eaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices 
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The focus again was on devising a workable definition that would 
permit the determination and apportionment of the individual 
criminal responsibility for the leaders, instigators, and organizers, 
among others, who had participated in the formulation or execution 
of a common plan or conspiracy to commit the underlying prohibited 
acts in the Asian theatre.  
The need for a new category of crimes at Nuremberg and Tokyo 
resulted from the fact that traditional international law only 
prohibited certain acts of war when in conflict with other States, not 
atrocities committed by a government against its own citizens. The 
latter type of conduct was deemed to be an internal affair of the 
concerned State, not the business of other States, mostly because of 
the influence of strong nineteenth-century positivist notions of 
sovereignty. Because the IMT Charter was the first clear statement of 
the law governing crimes against humanity, without the war nexus, it 
opened the door to the potential argument that prosecutions at 
Nuremberg were based on ex post facto laws. As Professor 
deGuzman put it, “linking crimes against humanity to the ostensibly 
treaty-based war crimes and crimes against peace provided a shield 
against charges that the prosecutions for these crimes violated the 
principle of legality or nullum crimen sine lege.”34 There was in fact 
contention to that effect, but the argument was roundly rejected by 
the Tribunal on the basis that the principle did not apply to that 
situation. Similarly, although the IMT determined that “no crime 
without law” was a general principle of justice that militated in favor 
of trials rather than a limitation on sovereignty, it claimed, perhaps 
dubiously given the doctrine’s seemingly settled nature, that there 
was not yet universal consensus under customary international law 
on the illegality of ex post facto laws.35 
 
participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to 
commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any 
person in execution of such plan”). Very few crimes against humanity charges 
were brought against the defendants as an overwhelming majority were for crimes 
against peace.  
 34. deGuzman, supra note 11, at 122. 
 35. Cf. ANTONIO CASSESE ET AL., THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 354–55 (2002) (“Immediately after World 
War II, the nullem crimen sine lege principle could be regarded as a moral maxim 
designed to yield to superior exigencies whenever it would have been contrary to 
justice not to hold persons accountable for appalling atrocities. The strict legal 
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In the end, mostly as a result of the Allied countries’ unease with 
the first legal use of the concept of crimes against humanity, many of 
the Nuremberg convictions actually emphasized the legally required 
linkage between the offense and violations of the laws and customs 
of war and crimes against peace. To prove crimes against humanity, 
the acts relied on before the outbreak of war must have been in 
execution of, or in connection with, any crime within the jurisdiction 
of the Tribunal. The IMT declined to declare all the Nazi acts before 
1939 crimes against humanity, but after the war had begun, in so far 
as the inhumane acts charged in the indictment did not constitute war 
crimes, they were all committed in execution of, or in connection 
with, the aggressive war, and therefore constituted crimes against 
humanity. That said, despite the IMT’s willingness to additionally 
convict some of the defendants for crimes against humanity on top of 
war crimes and crimes against peace, these limitations contributed to 
the restricted development of the case law on this offense, as the 
focus of the final judgment was more on interpretation and 
application of the other two crimes. This thereby gave rise to greater 
uncertainty later on as to the concept’s status in customary 
international law, although the 1945 definition was subsequently 
formally endorsed by the international community.36 
Crimes against humanity, similarly defined as in the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo Tribunals, also found its way into Article II(2)(a) of 
Allied Control Council Law No. 10.37 Under that law, which 
 
prohibition of ex post facto law had not yet found expression in international law; 
at least, it did not appear to comprise a general principle of law generally accepted 
by all States.”). 
 36. See Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the 
Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95(1), at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1 
(Dec. 11, 1946) (directing the formulation, for purposes of a codification of 
international offenses, of the principles recognized in the IMT Charter and the 
Nuremberg Tribunal’s judgments); Special Rapporteur, Report on the Formulation 
of Nürnberg Principles, Int’l Law Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/22 (Apr. 12, 1950) 
(by J. Spiropoulos), reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 181, 191-95, 
U.N. Doc A/CN.4/22 (presenting the International Law Commission’s proposed 
formulation of said principles). 
 37. Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and 
Against Humanity, Control Council Law No. 10, 20 December 1945, 3 OFFICIAL 
GAZETTE CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY 50 (1946), reprinted in 1 TRIALS OF 
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL 
COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 xvi-xix (1949) (defining crimes against humanity as 
“[a]trocities and offenses, including but not limited to murder, extermination, 
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provided the uniform legal basis for the allies to prosecute war 
criminals and other similar offenders in their respective zones of 
occupation, the definition of crimes against humanity grew to 
encompass additional prohibited acts and also eliminated the war 
nexus. These prosecutions later faced criticism for alleged non-
compliance with the legality principle. The inconsistent case law 
emanating from the judgments for those cases added a layer of 
confusion to an already incoherent and contested offense.  
B. THE ROAD TO HEAVEN IS PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS: 
ELIMINATING THE STATE POLICY REQUIREMENT  
IN THE ICTY AND ICTR  
Like the IMT Charter, the Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), which was the next 
major attempt to create an ad hoc tribunal since the end of World 
War II, does not include an explicit policy requirement in its 
definition of crimes against humanity.38 However, the early 
jurisprudence of that court adopted the view that such a policy was 
an implicit element of crimes against humanity under customary 
international law.39 In the seminal first case, Tadic, the ICTY Trial 
Chamber found in 1997 that customary international law did require 
that crimes against humanity be committed pursuant to a policy but 
that the policy was not required to originate from the State.40 This 
 
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts 
committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or 
religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country 
where perpetrated”). 
 38. See ICTY Statute, supra note 6, art. 5 (“The International Tribunal shall 
have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when 
committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and 
directed against any civilian population: (a) murder; (b) extermination; (c) 
enslavement; (d) deportation; (e) imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) rape; (h) 
persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; (i) other inhumane acts.”). 
 39. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 653 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=4027812b4 (finding that crimes against 
humanity have traditionally been understood to entail “some form of policy to 
commit [the] acts” given that they are the result of “a deliberate attempt to target a 
civilian population”). 
 40. See id. ¶¶ 654–55 (holding that customary international law has evolved to 
recognize that such policies may be pursued by non-government forces with de 
facto control over, or free movement within, a defined territory and that this could 
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assessment, which actually had arisen out of a foray into the meaning 
of “attack directed against the civilian population,” was emphatically 
rejected by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in the Kunarac 
judgment of 2002. The appeals court held that a review of the status 
of the State or organizational policy requirement under customary 
international law overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that 
neither State action nor a policy of any kind was required to establish 
crimes against humanity.41 The judges concluded that the existence 
of a plan or policy may prove to be evidentially relevant, but 
ultimately they deemed that it was not a required legal ingredient of 
the crime.  
The opinion in the Kunarac case, which was rendered only about 
five years after Tadic, has been cited widely in subsequent cases in 
both the ICTY and its sister court, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), for this proposition.42 However, this 
reliance seems to be attributable more to the clarity of its conclusion 
than the strength of the case law cited in support of it. As has been 
noted by many prominent scholars, of whom Professors Bassiouni 
and Schabas are two examples, a careful review of the sources that 
the judges used to support their conclusion in this famous footnote of 
international criminal law reveals that the role of the policy 
requirement for crimes against humanity rests more on quicksand 
than on solid ground.43 At its best, the status of the requirement was 
 
emanate from a governmental, organizational, or group policy). 
 41. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 98 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002), http://www.unhcr.org/ 
refworld/docid/3debaafe4.html. 
 42. See Prosecutor v. Blaškic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, ¶ 120 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004), http://www.unhcr.org/ 
refworld/publisher,ICTY,,,4146f0eb4,0.html (citing Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 
& IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 98) (“The Appeals Chamber agrees that a plan or 
policy is not a legal element of a crime against humanity, though it may be 
evidentially relevant in proving that an attack was directed against a civilian 
population and that it was widespread or systematic.”); Prosecutor v. Semanza, 
Case No. ICTR-97-20-A, Judgment, ¶ 269 (May 20, 2005), http://www.unhcr.org/ 
cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=48abd53e1a (also citing Kunarac, Case 
No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 98) (“Contrary to the submissions of 
the Appellant, the Prosecution did not have to prove the existence of a high-level 
policy against the Tutsi: although the existence of a policy or plan may be useful to 
establish that the attack was directed against a civilian population and that it was 
widespread and systematic, it is not an independent legal element.”). 
 43. See Schabas, supra note 30, at 959–64 (finding the ICTY’s conclusion as to 
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more unclear at the time of the Kunarac decision than was initially 
suggested. This is especially so considering that the ICTY 
completely ignored opposing authorities, such as the Rome Statute 
definition of the crime, which arguably is more indicative of the 
views of States and perhaps even reflective of customary 
international law. 
Despite this acknowledgement, the ICTY expressed some 
uncertainty about what role that policy element should play. The trial 
court in the Kupreškić case, for example, held that even though 
crimes against humanity necessarily implied the existence of a 
policy, it was probably more of a useful threshold to be considered 
rather than a requirement of crimes against humanity as such.44 It 
held that crimes against humanity need not be State-sponsored, but 
that they must at least be condoned or tolerated by the State. The 
organizational policy element could also be satisfied by an entity or 
group that possessed de facto authority over a territory, according to 
the Tribunal.45 The Kupreškić chamber then qualified these 
statements with the concession that crimes against humanity are 
usually committed pursuant to a criminal government policy.46 While 
rejecting the argument that crimes against humanity could only be 
committed pursuant to State-sponsored policy, the Kupreškić 
decision seemed to express uncertainty about exactly what role the 
policy requirement should play, or what type of group would be 
necessary, to implement that policy. It was a clear signal of judicial 
discomfort with the requirement.  
A year later, another ICTY Trial Chamber further weakened the 
significance of the plan or policy requirement in the Kordic case by 
adopting and perhaps even extending the reasoning in Kupreškić. It 
determined that crimes against humanity were not required to be 
committed pursuant to an explicit policy, but that the existence of a 
policy was an important indicative factor to take into account in 
 
the lack of a policy requirement to be a “results-oriented political decision” based 
on a “very summary discussion”); Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 24–26. 
 44. Prosecutor v. Kupreškic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment, ¶ 552 (Int’l 
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/ 
kupreskic/tjug/en/kup-tj000114e.pdf. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. ¶ 553 (observing that national case law tends to emphasize this aspect of 
the offense). 
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evaluating whether crimes against humanity had in fact occurred.47 
This group of judges arguably went a bit further when they held in 
Kordic that it would “not be appropriate” to impose a definite policy 
requirement or to adopt a strict view of it for the purposes of 
discerning crimes against humanity.48  
Following the Kordic trial ruling, the ICTY appeals judges 
attempted to resolve the policy requirement debate definitively in the 
Kunarac case. In a simple footnote whose relatively short length 
belies the moral and legal ambition of its conclusion, the Appeals 
Chamber rejected the assertion that a plan or a policy was even a 
necessary element to consider in evaluating crimes against humanity 
under customary international law.49 In support of this assessment, 
 
 47. Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 181–82 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001), http://www.unhcr.org/ 
cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=41483e9be. 
 48. Id. ¶ 182. The Appeals Chamber did not have to revisit this point because 
both the Prosecution and the Defense did not ultimately contest the policy 
requirement, with the ICTY Prosecutor assuming that the matter had been settled 
by the Kupreškić appeals ruling. Id. 
 49. The footnote is as follows: 
There has been some debate in the jurisprudence of this Tribunal as to 
whether a policy or plan constitutes an element of the definition of crimes 
against humanity. The practice reviewed by the Appeals Chamber 
overwhelmingly supports the contention that no such requirement exists under 
customary international law. See, for instance, Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg 
Charter; Nuremberg Judgement, Trial of the Major War Criminals before the 
International Military Tribunal, Nüremberg, 14 November 1945 - 1 October 
1945, in particular, pp 84, 254, 304 (Streicher) and 318-319 (von Schirach); 
Article II(1)(c) of Control Council Law No. 10; In re Ahlbrecht, ILR 16/1949, 
396; Ivan Timofeyevich Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth of Australia and 
Anor, (1991) 172 CLR 501; Case FC 91/026; Attorney-General v Adolph 
Eichmann, District Court of Jerusalem, Criminal Case No. 40/61; Mugesera 
et al. v Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, IMM-5946-98, 10 May 
2001, Federal Court of Canada, Trial Division; In re Trajkovic, District Court 
of Gjilan (Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), P Nr 68/2000, 6 March 
2001; Moreno v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), Federal 
Court of Canada, Court of Appeal, 1994g 1 F.C. 298, 14 September 1993; 
Sivakumar v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), Federal 
Court of Canada, Court of Appeal, 1994g 1 F.C. 433, 4 November 1993. See 
also Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security 
Council Resolution 808 (1993), S/25704, 3 May 1993, paras 47-48; Yearbook 
of the International Law Commission (ILC), 1954, vol. II, 150; Report of the 
ILC on the work of its 43rd session, 29 April - 19 July 1991, Supplement No 
10 (UN Doc No A/46/10), 265-266; its 46th session, 2 May - 22 July 1994, 
Supplement No 10 (UN Doc No A/49/10), 75-76; its 47th session, 2 May - 21 
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the Tribunal cited ample case law from the national courts of the 
Netherlands, Canada, and Yugoslavia, as well as to the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, among other sources.50 However, the strength of these 
sources in supporting this assertion is open to serious doubt. A 
review of the case law cited in the Kunarac footnote, as well as the 
authorities that preceded that decision, appears to more reliably 
support the conclusion that the role of the policy requirement for 
crimes against humanity was never settled prior to that decision.51  
Essentially, the judges in Kunarac waved the magic wand in an 
attempt to wish away the State or organizational policy requirement, 
perhaps because of the normative belief that such an approach was 
better for the more effective criminalization of gross human rights 
violations. But that effort appears to have been unsuccessful for 
various reasons. For instance, in respect to some of the jurisdictions 
cited, the appeals judges cited immigration cases that had only 
incidentally touched on the meaning of crimes against humanity 
instead of the more applicable criminal law authorities.52 Similarly, 
 
July 1995, 47, 49 and 50; its 48th session, 6 May-26 July 1996, Supplement 
No 10 (UN Doc No A/51/10), 93 and 95-96. The Appeals Chamber reached 
the same conclusion in relation to the crime of genocide (Jelisić Appeal 
Judgement, para. 48). Some of the decisions which suggest that a plan or 
policy is required in law went, in that respect, clearly beyond the text of the 
statute to be applied (see, e.g., Public Prosecutor v Menten, Supreme Court of 
the Netherlands, 13 January 1981, reprinted in 75 ILR 331, 362-363). Other 
references to a plan or policy which has sometimes been used to support this 
additional requirement in fact merely highlight the factual circumstances of 
the case at hand, rather than impose an independent constitutive element (see, 
e.g., Supreme Court of the British Zone, OGH br. Z., vol. I, 19). Finally, 
another decision, which has often been quoted in support of the plan or policy 
requirement, has been shown not to constitute an authoritative statement of 
customary international law (see In re Altstötter, ILR 14/1947, 278 and 284 
and comment thereupon in Ivan Timofeyevich Polyukhovich v The 
Commonwealth of Australia and Anor, (1991) 172 CLR 501, pp. 586-587). 
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 98 n.114 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ 
docid/3debaafe4.html. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Schabas, supra note 30, at 959-64 (demonstrating that a number of the 
authorities cited in the footnote did not support the ICTY’s conclusion, and 
pointing to contrary authorities the Tribunal failed to consider, in particular Article 
7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute). 
 52.  For example, this is evident from a perusal of the Canadian case law cited, 
which ignored relevant Supreme Court of Canada authority. Yet, in fairness, there 
is an intersection between immigration and criminal law, especially in the denial of 
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as already observed, they ignored the significant Rome Statute 
contextual element requiring State or organizational policy and other 
contrary authorities. Nevertheless, Kunarac has been extensively 
cited by the ICTY in support of the proposition that neither a plan 
nor a policy of any kind is required for a crime against humanity 
under customary international law. It immediately became the 
darling of international prosecutors for lifting a heavy evidentiary 
burden off their shoulders. 
The decision has also been cited with approval by the sister 
ICTR.53 Like the ICTY, the Statute of the ICTR makes no explicit 
reference to a plan or policy requirement for crimes against 
humanity.54 And, although its definition of the crime against 
humanity offense differs from that of the ICTY in requiring that 
attacks be committed on certain discriminatory grounds, given their 
shared appeals chamber under Article 12(2), which was established 
 
asylum to suspects of international crimes through the exclusion clauses of the UN 
Refugee Convention. For the first thorough book-length analysis of the intersection 
of refugee and criminal law in national and international case law, see JOSEPH 
RIKHOF, THE CRIMINAL REFUGEE: THE TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS WITH A 
CRIMINAL BACKGROUND IN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW (2012). 
 53. See Prosecutor v. Martic, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Judgment, ¶ 43 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2007), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=469de5652 (citing Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-
23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 58) (“The crime ‘need not have been planned or 
supported by some form of policy’”); Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-
20-A, Judgment, ¶ 269 (May 20, 2005), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/ 
refworld/rwmain?docid=48abd53e1a (citing Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-
23/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 98) (“Contrary to the submissions of the Appellant, the 
Prosecution did not have to prove the existence of a high-level policy against the 
Tutsi: although the existence of a policy or plan may be useful to establish that the 
attack was directed against a civilian population and that it was widespread and 
systematic, it is not an independent legal element.”); Prosecutor v. Bradanin, Case 
No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 137 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Sept. 1, 2004), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid= 
4146fd744 (citing Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 98–
101) (“There is no requirement under customary international law that the acts of 
the accused need to be supported by any form of policy or plan.”). 
 54. See ICTR Statute, supra note 6, art. 3 (“The International Tribunal for 
Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following 
crimes when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any 
civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds: 
a) Murder; b) Extermination; c) Enslavement; d) Deportation; e) Imprisonment; 
f) Torture; g) Rape; h) Persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds; i) 
Other inhumane acts.”). 
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to help ensure a coherent body of law, the ICTR jurisprudence on 
point has largely paralleled the ICTY case law in rejecting an 
implicit plan or explicit policy element as a requirement for crimes 
against humanity. In Prosecutor v. Semanza,55 for example, the 
tribunal relied on the Kunarac case for its “clarification” that the 
existence of a plan or policy may be evidentially relevant in a 
determination of whether crimes against humanity have occurred, but 
that it is not a legal requirement.56 Subsequent cases, such as 
Sylvestre Gacumbitsi v. The Prosecutor,57 have reiterated this 
position, again invoking Kunarac as sound authority for the 
proposition that a policy element is not required for a finding that a 
crime against humanity had taken place.  
In sum, while both the ICTY and the ICTR jurisprudence have 
gradually rejected and ultimately abandoned the need for a State or 
organizational plan or policy element for crimes against humanity, 
and in the process of doing so influenced the direction of some 
national case law on this particular issue, it seems apparent from the 
above review, as well as that of other scholars, that the decisions of 
both tribunals are based on legally weak or at least legally 
questionable foundations.  
III. THE UNCERTAIN CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW STATUS OF THE STATE 
OR ORGANIZATIONAL POLICY REQUIREMENT 
A. PROSECUTIONS OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY  
IN NATIONAL COURTS 
Customary international law is considered a primary source of 
international law.58 In a classical sense, custom consists of the 
general practices of States that are carried out because of a sense of 
 
 55. Prosecutor v. Laurent Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment (May 
15, 2003), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,ICTR,,,48abd5a30,0.html. 
 56. Id. ¶ 329. 
 57. Prosecutor v. Gacumbtsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T, Judgment, ¶ 299 
(June 17, 2004), http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher,ICTR,,,48abd5220, 
0.html (citing Semanza as citing Kunarac). 
 58. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1055, 1060 (mandating that the Court apply “international custom, as 
evidence of a general practice accepted as law”). 
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legal obligation (opinio juris). As a general rule, evidence of 
customary international law can be found both in the consistency of 
State practice and in how widespread and dense that State practice is. 
In the context of international criminal law, this State practice seems 
most evident in the case law of national courts, which, like the ICTY 
and the ICTR jurisprudence, reveals the difficulty courts face in 
coming to a solid determination of the role of the policy requirement 
of crimes against humanity under customary international law. 
The French trial of Klaus Barbie provides a clear example of this 
ambiguity.59 Barbie was a notorious Gestapo leader who was 
stationed in Lyon during World War II. He was captured in Bolivia 
in 1983 and extradited to France to face charges of crimes against 
humanity that were based on the same definition of the offense used 
at Nuremberg.60 The French Court of Cassation defined crimes 
against humanity in Barbie as inhumane acts committed “in the name 
of a State practicing a hegemonic political ideology.”61 The Court 
further stated that these crimes must be committed “against the 
adversaries of this [State] policy, whatever the form of their 
opposition.”62 In this way, the tribunal suggested that a State policy 
or governmental involvement is, at a minimum, an element to take 
into account in evaluating whether crimes against humanity had 
occurred if indeed it was not a formal legal requirement.  
The Canadian case of Regina v. Finta of 1994 also offers useful 
insight into the status of crimes against humanity in customary 
international law, although the ICTY Appeals Chamber chose not to 
mention it in Kunarac, presumably because it was unfavorable to its 
position. Imre Finta was in charge of a Nazi investigation unit in 
Hungary in which thousands of Jews were confined and deported to 
 
 59. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., Dec. 
20, 1985, Bull. crim., 1985, No. 407, obs. Le Gunehec (Fr.). 
 60. See Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the 
Trial of Klaus Barbie, 98 YALE L.J. 1321, 1324–30 (1989) (summarizing Barbie’s 
life story and explaining how, due to technical reasons, at the time of his trial he 
could only be prosecuted in France for crimes against humanity). 
 61. Leila Sadat Wexler, The Interpretation of the Nuremberg Principles by the 
French Court of Cassation: From Touvier to Barbie and Back Again, 32 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 289, 342 (1994). 
 62. Id. (stating the additional elements of perpetration in a systematic fashion 
against persons on account of their racial or religious group). 
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concentration camps.63 After the war, he fled to Canada, where his 
identity was eventually discovered, and he was charged with war 
crimes as well as crimes against humanity.64 In addressing the 
elements of the latter crime, as in the Barbie case, the Supreme Court 
of Canada placed heavy emphasis on the importance of a State policy 
for crimes against humanity.65 Although the Criminal Code did not 
specify that a State plan or policy was an element of crimes against 
humanity for the offense to be prosecutable under Canadian law, the 
judges relied on expert testimony by a noted international criminal 
law scholar, Professor Bassiouni, for their finding that a State action 
or policy was a prerequisite to finding that crimes against humanity 
had occurred.66  
A noteworthy exception to the extensive reliance on the policy 
element of crimes against humanity is In re Ahlbrecht.67 Notable in 
the Dutch Special Criminal Court’s decision is the absence of any 
reference to a plan or policy element at all. In contrast, the Dutch 
opinion focused on the widespread or systematic nature of the attacks 
in determining whether they should be characterized as crimes 
against humanity. According to the Court, rather than the defining 
character being the involvement of the State, it is the magnitude and 
scope of crimes that raise them to the level of concern to the 
international community as a whole.68  
In a nutshell, according to these judicial interpretations, the 
primary distinction between this class of international compared to 
domestic crimes was whether the offenses were isolated acts of 
violence or whether the attacks were widespread or systematic or 
massive in scale such that they “shocked the conscience of 
mankind.”69 It follows that while the role of a State plan or policy is 
 
 63. R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, 725 (Can.). 
 64. Id. at 791–92. 
 65. Id. at 814 (distinguishing crimes against humanity from common criminal 
offenses in that the elements of the former are “undertaken in pursuance of a policy 
of discrimination or persecution of an identifiable group or race”). 
 66. Id. at 823 (finding therefore that the trial judge properly instructed the jury 
to consider whether the defendant knew he was “assisting in a policy of 
persecution”). 
 67. In re Member Ahlbrecht (Special Court of Cassation 1947), summarized in 
14 ANN. DIG. & REP. OF PUB. INT’L L. CASES 196 (1951) (Neth.). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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generally acknowledged in some domestic prosecutions of crimes 
against humanity, its treatment varies widely among national courts. 
It is sometimes viewed as a requirement, as the Barbie and Finta 
cases in France and Canada suggested, and sometimes ignored 
completely, as in the Ahlbrecht case in the Netherlands.  
B. THE SLOW EVOLUTION  
OF A CLEAR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY DEFINITION  
AT THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 
It was at the International Law Commission (“ILC”), between 
1950 and 1996, that most of the legal work was done trying to sort 
out the essence of crimes against humanity.70 While not without 
some serious ambiguity on a range of controversial issues relating to 
the justification for the offense, and some steps forward and 
sometimes backwards on aspects like the conflict nexus, the ILC’s 
definitions of crimes against humanity and attempts to isolate the 
inner core that make them proper subjects of international instead of 
domestic jurisdiction eventually converged to the view that the 
hallmarks of such offenses lie in their widespread or systematic 
nature.71 By their very nature, such crimes are frequently undertaken 
on the instigation, at the behest and support of or toleration of State 
authorities implementing some type of deliberate policy or plan 
while being targeted, wholly or partially, at the civilian population.72 
Nevertheless, in the final analysis, the public or private nature of the 
organization—that is, whether it is a State-like or non-State-like 
entity that is behind the perpetration of the crimes—was less material 
to the prerequisite condition for a finding that crimes against 
humanity have in fact occurred. This seems evident from a review of 
the ILC’s admittedly progressive codification effort. 
 
 70. For a thorough overview of the historical pedigree of crimes against 
humanity, including the progress and evolution of the ILC’s work, see the 
background section of Mohamed Elewa Badar, From the Nuremberg Charter to 
the Rome Statute: Defining the Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, 5 SAN 
DIEGO INT’L L.J. 73, 144 (2004). An excellent book-length treatment is also 
available: M.C. BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION 
AND CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION 42 (2011). 
 71. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly 
on the Work of Its Forty-Sixth Session, [1997] II(2) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N, UN 
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.l (Part 2), art. 21, para. 14.   
 72. Id. 
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In its 1954 Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and Security 
of Mankind, the ILC offered a definition of crimes against humanity 
describing them as “inhuman acts by the authorities of a State or by 
private individuals against any civilian population, such as murder, 
or extermination, or enslavement, or deportation, or persecutions on 
political, racial, religious or cultural grounds, when such acts are 
committed in execution of or in connexion with other offences 
defined in this article.”73 Although this formulation was rightly 
criticized by some scholars at the time for introducing some 
problematic new aspects, as Mohamed Badar has explained,74 on its 
face and as the ILC commentary helpfully clarified, this conception 
envisaged that crimes against humanity could be committed by any 
State authorities or even private individuals.75  
In 1991, the ILC considered yet another definition of this offense. 
It obliquely emphasized that the ultimate mischief of these crimes is 
that they are committed on a systematic or massive scale.76 While 
noting that the mass nature of the crimes often necessarily implies a 
plurality of victims, plurality of perpetrators as well as the plurality 
of the means employed, Special Rapporteur Doudou Thiam was only 
willing to go so far as to say that this suggests that crimes against 
humanity would more likely take place in the context of individuals 
taking advantage of a State or organizational apparatus to implement 
their objective.77 Importantly, in offering examples of circumstances 
of apartheid (wherein the State itself is the entity behind the 
violations) and “major financial groups” (that finance genocidaires 
and mercenaries for example), he did not consider the character of 
the group behind the attacks as determinative of the question whether 
 
 73. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 
Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc. 
A/2691; U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 9, ch. 3, art. 2, para. 11, (1954). 
 74. Badar, supra note 70, at 85. 
 75. Id. at 84 n.53. 
 76. See Special Rapporteur, Seventh Report on the Draft Code of Crimes 
Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, ¶¶ 60–61, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/419 and 
Add.I (1989) (by Doudou Thiam) [hereinafter Seventh Report on the Draft Code] 
(asking and answering the question whether an act needs to affect a mass of people 
to constitute a crime against humanity); see also Report of the International Law 
Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of Its Forty-Third Session, art. 
21, U.N. Doc. A/46/10; U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (1991). 
 77. Seventh Report on the Draft Code, supra note 76, ¶ 61. 
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crimes against humanity may be found to have taken place.78 What 
mattered in either scenario was that they had the capability to 
commit the offenses. Thiam was even comfortable with the notion 
that a single massive act may give rise to crimes against humanity 
provided that it takes place in the context of a larger coherent 
system.79 But again, his concern was not to delineate that only State 
organs can commit such crimes; to the contrary, he implied that 
while they are more likely to be the ones behind it, there is nothing to 
preclude others from being originators of the crime. 
When it adopted a third definition of the offense in 1996, the ILC 
conception of crimes against humanity had matured and contained 
the core elements that later laid the initial basis for discussions of an 
ICC definition. This time, the Draft Code characterized crimes 
against humanity as the commission of certain prohibited acts, such 
as murder, extermination, torture or enslavement, “when committed 
in a systematic manner or on a large scale and instigated or directed 
by a Government or by any organization or group.”80 The 
accompanying commentary noted that two predicate conditions had 
thus been introduced for an act to be deemed a crime against 
humanity.81 Firstly, the act must have been committed systematically 
or on a large scale. Systematicity implied that the inhumane acts 
must have occurred pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy leading 
to the continuous commission of the crimes—a factor that was 
included to exclude random acts that were not part of a broader 
policy or plan.82 The large scale character of the acts expressed the 
idea that they must also be directed against a “multiplicity of 
victims,”83 thereby eliminating the inhumane acts committed by a 
lone perpetrator against a sole victim but that are not part of a 
broader criminal system.   
As to the second condition, which mandated that the act be 
 
 78. Id. ¶ 61.  
 79. Id. ¶ 62. 
 80. See Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, art. 
18, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532; U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess. (July 8, 1996) (emphasis 
added). 
 81. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-
Eighth Session, ch. 2, art. 18, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/51/10; U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., 
Supp. No. 10 (1996). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. art. 18, ¶ 4.  
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instigated by a government or by an organization or group, the ILC 
commentary affirmed what should already be plain from the ordinary 
text above: that such action may be authored by any type of group—
again, irrespective of its qualification as a public or private entity. 
This requirement was introduced so that crimes against humanity 
would exclude the situation wherein an individual commits an 
inhumane act solely on his own initiative.84 The instigation or 
direction of either a government or an organization or a group, which 
“may or may not be affiliated with a government”, is what “gives the 
act its great dimension and makes it a crime against humanity 
imputable to private persons or agents of a State.”85  
IV. THE STATE OR ORGANIZATIONAL POLICY 
REQUIREMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT CASE LAW 
A. JUDICIAL DISSENSION  
IN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
Unlike the definition of crimes against humanity in the ICTY and 
ICTR Statutes and the ILC formulations for its Draft Code, the 
definition of the offense in the Rome Statute does include an explicit 
policy requirement for the purposes of qualification as crimes against 
humanity. Article 7 specifies that a crime against humanity refers to 
a list of underlying prohibited acts such as murder, extermination, 
torture, rape, apartheid, deportation or forcible transfer of a 
population, among others, “when committed as part of a widespread 
or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack.” This part of the provision endorses the 
mass crime prevention rationale of crimes against humanity that is 
evident from prior ILC iterations. Article 7(2)(a) then captures the 
so-called contextual element, explicitly clarifying that an “‘attack 
directed against any civilian population’ means a course of conduct 
involving the multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 
against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a 
State or organizational policy to commit such attack.”86 This part of 
 
 84. Id. art. 18, ¶ 5. 
 85. See id. art. 18, ¶ 5 (emphasis added). 
 86. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 90, 93-94 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
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the clause again underscores that the social harm that gives crimes 
against humanity its essence are the massive nature and scale of the 
crimes, but as a qualifier, limits them in the last part of the sentence 
to those of such offenses carried out using State or organizational 
means. This endorses the criminal State conception of this crime that 
is rooted in the IMT Charter, which tried to punish the criminal 
mischief of the entire Third Reich.  
The above textual review of Article 7 of the Rome Statute reveals 
the schizophrenia of the definition that at once nods to both the mass 
crime and the predatory State rationales for the offense. It is 
therefore not surprising that this would create space for interpretive 
schism among the judges once the Court received concrete cases. In 
both the decision authorizing an investigation into the situation in 
Kenya,87 and the subsequent decisions issuing joint summonses for 
the appearances of William Ruto, Francis Muthaura,88 and four other 
Kenyans, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber found that it had jurisdiction 
over the violence that occurred following the announcement of the 
contested results of the East African nation’s presidential elections of 
December 27, 2007, based on its conclusion that the crimes appeared 
to have been committed pursuant to an organizational policy.  
According to the majority’s interpretation, the “State or 
organizational policy” required by Article 7(2)(a) can be 
implemented by any organization that is capable of committing 
widespread or systematic attacks against a civilian population.89 
 
 87. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Decision 
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation 
into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc854562.pdf (containing a seminal ruling regarding the 
scope of crimes against humanity) [hereinafter Kenya Authorization Decision]. 
 88. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for Summons to Appear for William Samoei Ruto, Henry 
Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/exeres/E0EB838E-59AA-4F92-9B6D-E66DD194050E.htm 
(summonsing six Kenyans to appear before the ICC for their alleged crimes against 
humanity, with the suspects including high-ranking civil servants and distinguished 
politicians) [hereinafter Ruto Decision]; Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case 
No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summonses to 
Appear for Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed 
Hussein Ali (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1037052.pdf. 
 89. Ruto Decision, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, ¶ 20 (implying that if a 
systematic attack occurs, that very fact should be evidence of the existence of a 
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Whether the group is capable of committing such an attack would be 
examined with certain non-required criteria in mind, and the 
understanding that the policy need not be formal or, for that matter, 
emanate from the State or entities belonging to it.90 In a way, this 
view tends to assert the primacy of the mass crime rationale for the 
textual definition of the offense. 
In all three cases, Judge Hans-Peter Kaul offered compelling 
dissenting opinions directed at reaffirming the criminal State 
justification for crimes against humanity. In contrast to the majority, 
the respected German judge would require the group to have certain 
State-like characteristics, a position that seems consistent with the 
IMT experience after World War II. In his view, the crucial 
contextual elements would include whether there was a collectivity, 
sharing in a common purpose, operating over a prolonged time 
period, with a recognized hierarchy or command structure including 
a policy-making level, the capacity to impose the policy and to 
sanction its members that fall out of line, and, crucially, the means to 
attack civilians on a wide scale.91 
Underlying these competing views over how to correctly interpret 
Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute are contrasting broad and narrow 
normative visions of the role of international criminal law and 
differing concerns over the implications of possibly expanding the 
jurisdiction of the ICC beyond the intent of the framers of the Rome 
 
State or organizational policy). 
 90. Id. ¶ 24–25 (examining the specific ground in which the Ruto-led group 
was held to be capable of committing a widespread systematic attack on a civilian 
population living in the Rift Valley). 
 91. See Kenya Authorization Decision, supra note 87, ¶ 51 (dissenting 
opinion): 
even though the constitutive elements of statehood need not be established 
those “organizations” should partake of some characteristics of a State. Those 
characteristics eventually turn the private “organization” into an entity which 
may act like a State or has quasi-State abilities. These characteristics could 
involve the following: (a) a collectivity of persons; (b) which was established 
and acts for a common purpose; (c) over a prolonged period of time; (d) 
which is under responsible command or adopted a certain degree of 
hierarchical structure, including, as a minimum, some kind of policy level; (e) 
with the capacity to impose the policy on its members and to sanction them; 
and (f) which has the capacity and means available to attack any civilian 
population on a large scale. 
  
2013] WHAT MAKES A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY 411 
Statute.92 As Professor Claus Kress has argued, the majority 
approach in the Kenya decision can be seen as favoring a teleological 
understanding of crimes against humanity that views the goal of 
international criminal law as promoting basic human values, and a 
broader or more expansive understanding of the State or 
organizational policy requirement as an ideal method of 
accomplishing that goal.93 This approach tends to view customary 
international law as evolving to allow the ICC’s jurisdiction to cover 
an expanding category of mass crimes that perhaps could eventually 
include even purely private organizations.94 
On the other hand, Judge Kaul’s more traditional approach could 
be seen as focusing the ICC on the narrower path of preventing 
impunity for truly international crimes sponsored by the State or its 
organs. His conception of crimes against humanity would seemingly 
keep the jurisdictional reach of international criminal law within the 
narrow confines of a set of strictly delineated core crimes and factual 
circumstances that are not necessarily punishable within the domestic 
legal system in which they occur, and would additionally ensure that 
the Court does not infringe on State sovereignty by overstepping the 
boundaries of its jurisdiction.95 This perspective perhaps reflects a 
realist view to the effect that the challenge of fighting impunity 
necessarily implies a reasonable burden sharing between States and 
 
 92. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: INTRODUCTION, ANALYSIS AND INTEGRATED 
TEXT 151–52 (2005): 
Article 7 does not bring a new development to crimes against humanity, 
namely its applicability to non-state actors. If that were the case, the mafia, 
for example, could be charged with such crimes before the ICC, and that is 
clearly neither the letter nor the spirit of Article 7. 
 93. See Kress, supra note 16, at 861. 
 94. See Kenya Authorization Decision, supra note 87, ¶ 90: 
[A]s others have convincingly put forward, a distinction should be drawn on 
whether a group has the capability to perform acts which infringe on basic 
human values: the associative element, and its inherently aggravating effect, 
could eventually be satisfied by “purely” private criminal organizations, thus 
not finding sufficient reasons for distinguishing the gravity of patterns of 
conduct directed by “territorial” entities or by private groups, given the 
latter’s acquired capacity to infringe basic human values.” 
 95. See Kress, supra note 16, at 861 (“The contextual requirement of crimes 
against humanity reflects the wish of states that these (and other) rather heavy 
restrictions on their sovereignty only apply in particular instances of human rights 
violations.”) 
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international criminal tribunals possessing limited jurisdiction and 
resources like the ICC. Under this view, the contours of the core 
crimes would presumably be clearly defined, interpreted narrowly, 
and applied precisely to situations so obviously within the 
parameters of the Court’s jurisdiction as to be uncontroversial.  
In his dissent, Judge Kaul explained that his understanding of the 
State or organizational policy requirement would require that there 
be an organization for proof of the contextual element of crimes 
against humanity—and not just any organization, but crucially one 
possessing State-like qualities.96 In the subsequent Ruto decision, 
Kaul clarified this and the other criteria he had set forth by carefully 
reviewing the material relied on by the majority in evaluating the 
Kenyan post-election violence.97 He concluded that the evidence as a 
whole failed to establish the existence of an organization. He 
reasoned that it seemed hard to substantiate the claim that the groups 
responsible for the attacks had a hierarchical structure. This lack of 
structure meant that the requirement of a responsible command was 
therefore lacking.98 Also, these were groups organized on an ad hoc 
basis for a specific purpose and were temporary instead of permanent 
organizations.99  
In the final analysis, according to Judge Kaul, although the attacks 
were seemingly planned and organized, the evidence that the 
Prosecution proffered did not reliably demonstrate that they were 
part of an organizational policy as defined by Article 7(2)(a).100 The 
dissent also expressed serious concerns about the implications of a 
possibly indefinite expansion of the ICC’s jurisdiction, including a 
potentially unmanageable caseload, an infringement on the State 
 
 96. Kenya Authorization Decision, supra note 87, ¶¶ 51, 66–67 (dissenting 
opinion) (rejecting the majority’s threshold question of whether a group is able to 
act in a way that infringes on fundamental human values). 
 97. Ruto Decision, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, ¶¶ 48–50 (dissenting opinion) 
(opining, for example, that an ethnically based assembly of perpetrators engaged in 
the planning and coordination of brutality in itself does not equate a State-like 
organization). 
 98. Id. ¶ 46 (coordinating activities taking place at a horizontal level cannot 
substitute for a vertical hierarchical structure). 
 99. Id. ¶¶ 12, 47 (concluding that the creation of the Network was to assist 
political leaders in their plight for power during the presidential elections). 
 100. Id. ¶ 50 (containing an expressis verbis legal requirement of a State or 
organizational policy). 
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sovereignty of those countries that more legitimately have 
jurisdiction, and the possible erosion of the Court’s legitimacy that 
these issues could entail.101 
The problem is that, though hard to prove definitively, both the 
majority and Judge Kaul’s interpretation of the contextual element of 
crimes against humanity in Article 7(2)(a) may be correct from the 
standpoint of the text and perhaps even the legislative intent of the 
Rome Statute. We have already seen above that the text of Article 7 
endorses at least two differing understanding of the core thrust of the 
crime, presumably to appease States on different sides of the issue 
during the negotiations. Nonetheless, the unofficial reports of 
academics involved in negotiating Article 7 offer helpful but 
sometimes conflicting information in terms of which of these views 
ought to prevail. Some, like Professor Robinson, suggest that the 
provision was the result of several pressures that had to be worked 
through to achieve political compromise between the countries that 
worried that crimes against humanity could be used as a backdoor to 
intrude into national sovereignty and those that sought a workable 
definition that reflected positive developments in the law.102  
On the other hand, others like Professor Bassiouni, the chair of the 
drafting committee of the Rome Statute negotiations, have weighed 
in on this particular debate only to assert that the organizational 
policy requirement was intended to apply only to organs of the State 
such as the police, military, intelligence, or other similar 
organizational units.103 In his view, Article 7(2)(a) will therefore not 
 
 101. Id. ¶¶ 4–7 (expanding the number of cases would not only increase 
scepticism as to the interests served by the court but would also blur the lines of 
what crimes actually constitute a threat to humanity). 
 102. See Robinson, The Elements of Crimes Against Humanity, supra note 1, at 
57: 
The definition of crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute was shaped by 
at least three different negotiating pressures. First, many states were 
concerned that the law of crimes against humanity might be used to intrude on 
national sovereignty. These states therefore pressed for a more cautious, or 
even restrictive, approach to crimes against humanity, with high thresholds 
and narrow definitions. Second, in contrast to the first pressure, many other 
states were committed to a broad, workable definition reflecting the positive 
developments recognized in various authorities. Third, because of the broad 
potential applicability of the ICC Statute definition, there was considerable 
pressure for a high level for precision and clarity. 
 103. Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 24 (arguing further that those, including the 
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extend to other organizations that are purely non-State actors.104 For 
this reason, in his view, the Kenya Authorization majority decision is 
a serious cause for concern because it distorts the intention behind 
having the State or organizational policy requirement as a 
jurisdictional trigger by broadening its ambit further than was 
initially envisaged.105 
The reports of these scholars involved in the ICC treaty 
negotiations processes are all helpful. Yet a cursory examination of 
the plenary records of the final July 1998 Rome Statute negotiations 
regarding crimes against humanity appears to suggest that the bulk of 
the States focused more on the magnitude and scale of the crime as 
the core justification of the internationality of the offense as opposed 
to the organizational nature and character of the entity behind its 
commission. This point is implicit in the plain text of the provision 
itself, which adopts the widespread or systematic criteria. There is 
also evidence that the State or organizational policy requirements 
were embedded as limiting criteria to help define the appropriate 
circumstances under which to trigger international involvement. This 
was one way to distinguish attacks of a widespread or systematic 
nature, rather than acts carried out by some random persons or bands 
of criminals acting on their own initiative for their own purely selfish 
motives.  
The trouble is that, as is usually the case with treaty negotiations, 
many delegates did not actually appear to address the specific State 
or organizational policy requirement. On the other hand, there were 
three delegates that expressed strong objections to the prospective 
inclusion of the requirement in the Rome Statute. Jamaica’s delegate 
was unhappy that the crimes against humanity definition confined 
the concept to attacks directed against civilians in furtherance of a 
State or organizational policy.106 Congo’s delegate sounded more 
 
Pre-Trial Chamber in the Kenya cases, who have advocated a broadened definition 
of crimes against humanity to encompass non-State actors would effectively gut 
the essence that converts crimes against humanity from a domestic to an 
international crime). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Bassiouni, supra note 15, at 208. 
 106. See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June – 1 7 July 1998, 
Official Records, Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings 
of the Committee of the Whole, 328, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II), June 15-
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blunt. To him, the inclusion of the element “constituted an 
unacceptable threshold that in no way reflected contemporary 
realities or international law.”107 He did not elaborate, but keeping in 
mind the types of non-State actor conflicts that we see in that region 
of Africa today, it is not far-fetched to speculate that the 
“contemporary realities” to which he referred were those of modern 
warfare in which more conflicts are of an intra-state rather than 
inter-state nature and feature rebel groups and other non-State actors 
as key perpetrators. 
Be that as it may, it was the Sri Lankan delegate, Ambassador 
Palihakkara, who appeared to be the most consistent and outspoken 
and most on point for this particular issue. Foreshadowing the debate 
that the Court was to be mired in many years later in the Kenya 
Situation, he kept insisting that the crimes against humanity draft 
definition be made clear that the State or organizational policy 
requirement was “also intended to cover the policy of non-
governmental entities.”108 His statement, perhaps motivated by his 
home country’s experience with the Tamil Tiger rebels, and those of 
the Congolese and Jamaican delegates, while reflecting an obvious 
minority of the States present, are still significant for what they said. 
Equally importantly, his understanding did not draw fire from any of 
the other States. It would be too much to claim that the silence by the 
other countries constituted endorsement of the Sri Lankan, 
Congolese, and Jamaican positions, since it is possible that some 
delegates might not even have had strong views on the issue. That 
said, there seems to be a measure of acquiescence in the 
circumstances though his position was also not adopted. In any 
event, the three delegates’ statements, at a minimum, prove that, for 
the few States that turned their minds to the issue, the contention that 
the State or organizational requirement could not have been intended 
to cover the activities of private groups or organizations seems to 
now be in some doubt.  
However, as can be seen by the strident debate between the 
majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber and the dissenting judge in the 
 
17 July, 1998. The delegate was later elected to serve as a judge at the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, where he is currently 
in the Appeals Chamber.  
 107. See id. at 344–45.  
 108. Id. at 287–88. 
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Kenya Authorization decision, the required characteristics of the 
States or organizations outside of the formal State structure that are 
capable of developing and implementing policies to attack civilians 
remain contentious among the judges, despite the relative specificity 
of the Rome Statute definition and the position of some of the State 
negotiators unearthed above.109 The crucial issue turns on whether 
the policy requirement encompasses not only the policies of States, 
which may be adopted at the highest levels or by regional or even 
local organs, but also those of any organizations and, if so, whether 
they may also include non-State entities that are capable of infringing 
on basic human values by adopting and implementing a policy to 
commit widespread attacks against a civilian population. 
The Basic Human Values Test that the majority propounded 
focuses less on the nature of the group and more on the harm and the 
capabilities of the group engaging in the proscribed conduct. It 
implicitly assumes that the existence of a State, State-like 
organization, or another type of organized entity would suffice to 
trigger crimes against humanity. This conclusion, from a purposive 
perspective of wanting to extend the reach of the ICC to cover any 
organized non-State actors, seems reasonable even if in practice it 
may pose other types of new challenges. The benefit is that reading 
the organization requirement liberally might be more realistic in a 
non-Western European setting. This is important given that, in 
certain parts of the world such as Africa where all of the Court’s 
current caseload is from, the State may be so weak that it is incapable 
of asserting effective control over the territory and in some instances 
may even be on the verge of collapse. In such settings, informally 
organized armed groups or rebels may have already played a role in 
undermining the State or could come together at the last minute to 
fill the vacuum left by the State and, in so doing, act for a common 
 
 109. See WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: 
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE 152 (2010): 
The reference to “State or organizational plan or policy” should probably be 
construed broadly enough to encompass entities that act like States, even if 
they are not formally recognized as such. But an interpretation of the word 
“organizational” by which it refers to any group of individuals, brought 
together for whatever purpose, is an absurdity. In a literal sense, an 
organization could include a social club, a charitable organization, a 
motorcycle gang, an organized crimes syndicate, and a terrorist cell. This is 
obviously not what Article 7(2) (a) contemplates. 
  
2013] WHAT MAKES A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY 417 
nefarious purpose.  
To fill the gap, these private actors could decide to carry out 
widespread or systematic attacks on the local civilian population, 
sometimes though not necessarily on purely ethnic or other such 
discriminatory grounds. This raises some concern whether the debate 
between the majority and dissenting judges on how to properly 
classify the actor as a State or a State-like entity before fulfilling the 
threshold for crimes against humanity is merited and, if so, whether 
it is or should be deemed a generally applicable standard or assessed 
on a situation-specific basis. Indeed, considering the proliferation of 
small arms and light weapons in many modern armed conflicts, it is 
possible to envision many situations where private entities or 
individuals who have no connection with the State or a governmental 
authority would decide and possess the capacity to carry out mass 
attacks against civilians. These could rise to such a level of disquiet 
for other States as to constitute a crime against humanity and even a 
grave threat to regional or international peace and security. 
The majority’s interpretation of the organizational policy 
requirement, in the absence of definitive legislative history showing 
the actual intention of the drafters, therefore seems defensible, 
contrary to Judge Kaul’s suggestion. Indeed, a reasonably strong 
argument can be made that what the Pre-Trial Chamber majority did 
was nothing more than flesh out and apply a vague word or phrase in 
a treaty provision to the specific circumstances arising from the 
Kenya Situation wherein private militia with less strong links to the 
State seemed to have been part of the organized campaign of post-
election violence. This interpreter function is the type of role that we 
expect from international judges, including those at the ICC, who 
States often entrust with the responsibility of applying the broad text 
of a multilateral treaty to specific cases in specific situations against 
specific individuals. If this position is correct, it seems arguable that 
what is going on at the Court is merely part of the natural and 
organic process of the development of statutory provisions and their 
purposive interpretation and application to concrete situations and 
cases. 
Of course, it is also possible to view the majority position 
differently. Judge Kaul, who clearly endorses the criminal State 
thesis of crimes against humanity, intimates that the majority adopted 
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a progressive and broad interpretation of the crimes against humanity 
offense by shifting the goal posts beyond States or State-like entities 
in a way that permits the ICC to expand its jurisdiction infinitely to 
cover any massive or heart-rending human rights violations.110 Such 
expansion, which perhaps is driven by the substantiality of the 
crimes committed, may reflect the moral outrage that we naturally 
feel—the kind of push that compels many international criminal 
lawyers to want to ensure that someone pays for the heinous crimes 
committed in a given situation. If such an argument is correct, then it 
can be continued that no matter how well intentioned, an interpretive 
technique that extends the Court’s subject matter reach in respect to 
crimes against humanity comes with some danger. It would either be 
seen as acceptable and therefore a good change to the law or be 
deemed unacceptable and thus open to contestation. If the latter, the 
question might arise whether that judicial position might not generate 
pushback from States that could undermine the current and future 
direction of the permanent international penal court. 
Why? The issue is that a perceived judicial widening of the scope 
of crimes against humanity might be viewed by some States Parties, 
who subscribe to the predatory State justification of the offense, as a 
violation of the carefully crafted compromise that Article 7(2)(a) was 
predicated upon. Considering the large number of States Parties to 
the Court, at writing numbering 121, it may even plausibly be said 
that the current ICC definition of the crime is more reflective of 
customary international law.111 Still, Article 10 of the Rome Statute 
does clarify that the permanent Court’s definitions should not be 
interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or 
developing rules of international law.112 Any derogation from that 
standard, considering that States had the option to adopt an ICTY–
ICTR inspired definition of the same offense eliminating the policy 
requirement, but chose not do so, would presumably require some 
 
 110. Kenya Authorization Decision, supra note 87, ¶¶ 10, 44, 55, 67 (dissenting 
opinion) (providing justification for upholding a high threshold for international 
crimes, so as not to confuse serious crimes against humanity with other crimes). 
 111. deGuzman, supra note 11, at 126 (noting that, due to the sharp divergences 
among States, the Rome Statute itself does not purport to be a codification of a 
customary international law definition of crimes against humanity).  
 112. Id. at 126 (observing that, as more and more States use the ICC definition 
of crimes against humanity, it is possible that it could one day be seen as indicative 
of customary international law). 
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explanation. This is all the more so given that the ad hoc tribunal 
case law reading out the State-organizational policy requirement for 
crimes against humanity also purported to be applying customary 
international law. On this logic, it can be suggested that any judicial 
interpretation of a crime that is not strictly construed, as pro–human 
rights as it might otherwise be, would carry several troubling 
implications for the cooperation with and perception of the ICC in 
the international community. This is especially so given the edict in 
Article 22(2) of the Rome Statute explicitly mandating that ICC 
crimes be not only strictly interpreted, but that they should also not 
be extended by any form of analogy.  
In addition to these points, two related observations seem 
warranted. First, as Judge Kaul obliquely warned in his dissent to the 
Kenya Authorization decision, removing what the negotiating 
countries agreed to in good faith arguably infringes on the principles 
of State consent and sovereignty by interfering with the competence 
of legal systems that more appropriately have jurisdiction over 
crimes that have occurred within their own territory.113 Proof of the 
Rome Statute preference for national action to combat international 
crimes is amply confirmed by the limited set of core crimes included 
in the statute and the endorsement of the principle of 
complementarity—as opposed to that of primacy, which obtains in 
the ad hoc tribunals—as the cornerstone upon which the entire ICC 
system was founded.114 
Second, like other international criminal tribunals, in the absence 
of independent enforcement mechanisms, the ICC is not only 
founded on State cooperation but is also extremely dependent upon 
it.115 A key implication of Judge Kaul’s argument was that having a 
looser conception of State or organizational policy widens the 
boundaries of crimes against humanity in such a way that it would 
likely require the Court to be involved in infinitely more situations 
than a narrower interpretation would. In this view, the expectations 
of victims that the international community will intervene to render 
 
 113. See Kenya Authorization Decision, supra note 87, ¶ 10 (dissenting opinion) 
(stating that the limited resources of the court must be taken into account when 
determining the extent to which jurisdiction reaches). 
 114. See Rome Statute supra note 86, art. 1 (“[The Court] shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”). 
 115. See id. arts. 98–111. 
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justice on their behalf would be heightened. But if victims’ hopes are 
raised and dashed, because the ICC cannot realistically investigate or 
prosecute in every possible crime base within its jurisdiction, there 
would be even greater pressure on the Court to justify why it is 
choosing to get involved in some situations but not others. This could 
lead to arbitrary situation and case selection, on the part of the 
prosecutor, which might in turn leave the institution vulnerable to the 
perception that it is not capable of rendering justice for all, thereby 
hurting its legitimacy.  
In any event, despite the apparent specificity of the requirements 
of crimes against humanity in Article 7 of the Rome Statute, there 
has been some debate surrounding its meaning even in the ICC 
jurisprudence. A brief look at other cases demonstrates this. On 
September 30, 2008, the Pre-Trial Chamber issued its confirmation 
of the charges in Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu 
Ngudjolo Chui.116 In that case, the chamber determined that the 
contextual element of Article 7(2)(a):  
ensures that the attack, even if carried out over a large geographical area 
or directed against a large number of victims, must still be thoroughly 
organized and follow a regular pattern. It must also be conducted in 
furtherance of a common policy involving public or private resources. 
Such a policy may be made either by groups of persons who govern a 
specific territory or by any organization with the capability to commit a 
widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population. The policy 
need not be explicitly defined by the organizational group. Indeed, an 
attack which is planned, directed organized — as opposed to spontaneous 
or isolated acts of violence — will satisfy this criterion.117  
As in the Ahlbrecht case, when discussing the type of attack, the 
judges focused on whether the crimes against civilians were 
sufficiently widespread or systematic to constitute crimes against 
humanity. They also established the policy threshold to be low, and 
the type and level of organization required somewhat minimal. By 
allowing any type of de facto policy to satisfy the contextual element 
of crimes against humanity, regardless of whether it is “explicitly 
defined,”118 and by bringing within its ambit any group or 
 
 116. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgement, 
¶ 396 (Sept. 30, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc571253.pdf. 
 117. Id. (emphasis added). 
 118. Id. (adopting the threshold for what constitutes a policy simply as the attack 
  
2013] WHAT MAKES A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY 421 
organization, whether public or private, the Chui decision linked the 
State or organizational policy element with the oft-discussed 
requirement that the attacks be widespread or systematic, rather than 
simply spontaneous or isolated incidents. This point lines up with the 
concerns of the ILC experts over the past few decades as well as 
those of many ICC negotiators of this crime. Under this judicially 
endorsed approach, the widespread and systematic concepts play a 
screening role to demarcate or isolate the type of violence that should 
attract the interest, condemnation, and action of the international 
community. This approach also seems to comport with the ICTY 
reasoning in the Tadic case.119  
In a subsequent ICC decision, another Pre-Trial Chamber adopted 
the same type of logic. Citing to the Chui decision, the Court held in 
its confirmation of the charges against Jean-Pierre Gomba that the 
mandate that crimes against humanity be committed pursuant to a 
State or organizational policy only requires that the offenses follow a 
regular pattern.120 Much like the foregoing case, and those from the 
ICTY post-Kunarac, the policy can be formulated by a “group of 
persons who govern a specific territory or by any organization with 
the capacity to commit a widespread and systematic attack against a 
civilian population.”121  
B. THE MEANING OF “STATE” AND “STATE POLICY” 
Understanding what would constitute a State or organizational 
policy under Article 7(2)(a) seemingly requires an understanding of 
what constitutes a “State” and a “State policy” under the Rome 
Statute. The ICC treaty does not define either of these terms. Article 
31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides the 
 
must be something more than spontaneous, isolated, or random acts of violence, 
based mostly from endorsement of the views taken on other occasions by the ICC 
Pre-Trial Chambers). 
 119. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 653 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/ 
vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=4027812b4 (emphasizing that no formal policy is 
required but instead can be deduced from notable acts even if they only occur on a 
widespread or systematic basis). 
 120. Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, 
Decision on the Confirmation of the Charges, ¶ 81 (June 15, 2009). 
 121. Id. (emphasis added) (distinguishing that the attacks need only be 
widespread or systematic, not both). 
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rules governing the interpretation of a treaty and states that a treaty 
must be interpreted in good faith, in light of its object and purpose.122 
In addition to the ordinary text of the treaty, subsequent agreements 
and State practice in application of the treaty may be taken into 
account to understand its text.123 Also, the ordinary language of the 
treaty may be superseded by a special meaning given to its text, if it 
can be established that this was the intent of the drafters.124  
The ordinary meaning of a state found in standard dictionary 
definitions denotes a politically organized group of people with a 
permanent population occupying a specific territory.125 However, 
although this term was taken as somewhat obvious in the ICC’s 
Kenya decisions, there is a measure of ambiguity in some of the 
important words in Article 7(2)(a) that harkens back to other debates 
about what types of entity may constitute a State in public 
international law. The assumption that their requirements have been 
met in the government entities that have been the subject of 
international prosecution has arguably contributed to the vagueness 
of the use of the term in international criminal law.  
Whatever the case, the generally accepted legal elements of 
statehood indicate a more technical definition than the ordinary 
dictionary meaning suggested here. It would basically require a 
permanent population, having control over a defined territory, the 
existence of a government, and the capacity to engage in formal 
relations with other States126—all criteria that are now said to be part 
 
 122. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331. 
 123. Id. art. 31(3)(a)–(b). 
 124. Id. art. 31(4). 
 125. See State, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/state (last visited Sept. 22, 2012) (defining a state as “a politically 
organized body of people usually occupying a definite territory”). 
 126. Although the formal requirements of statehood were classically stated in 
Article 1 of the 1933 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (the 
Montevideo Convention), which initially applied only to its sixteen parties in the 
Western hemisphere, the criteria it laid down are deemed to be universally 
applicable today because of their crystallization into general customary 
international law. As to how these norms have been incorporated in U.S. practice, 
see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 201 (1965): 
Under international law, a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a 
permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that 
engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such 
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of customary international law.  
Even if these minimal public international law criteria are met, of 
particular uncertainty in the criminal law context of crimes against 
humanity is how to recognize the existence of a formal State policy 
and, in turn, who would have the authority of implementing that 
policy. As Judge Kaul explains it in his dissent to the Kenya 
decision: 
acts of the central government and of any other organ at the regional or 
local level may be imputable to a State; however, considerations of 
attribution do not answer the question of who can establish a State 
policy. . . . [C]onsidering the specific circumstances of the case, a policy 
may also be adopted by an organ which, albeit at the regional level, such 
as the highest official or regional government in a province, has the means 
to establish a policy within its sphere of action.127 
This entails a fairly broad approach to the definition of a State 
policy by creating potential legal responsibility on the part of central 
governments for the actions of subsidiary regional or local 
governments. That, in and of itself, is not too solid a critique since it 
is settled in international law that the conduct of an organ of the 
State, or a territorial unit of a State, irrespective of whether it carries 
 
entities. 
a. Definition of state. While the definition in this section is generally 
accepted, each of its elements may present significant problems in unusual 
situations. In the absence of judicial or other means for authoritative and 
consistent determination, issues of statehood have been resolved by the 
practice of states reflecting political expediency as much as logical 
consistency. The definition in this section is well-established in international 
law; it is nearly identical to that in Article 1 of the Montevideo Convention on 
the Rights and Duties of States, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881, 165 
L.N.T.S. 19. 
b. Defined territory. An entity may satisfy the territorial requirement for 
statehood even if its boundaries have not been finally settled, if one or more 
of its boundaries are disputed, or if some of its territory is claimed by another 
state. An entity does not necessarily cease to be a state even if all of its 
territory has been occupied by a foreign power or if it has otherwise lost 
control of its territory temporarily. 
The Montevideo Convention similarly provides in Article 1 that “The state as a 
person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a 
permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to 
enter into relations with the other states.” Montevideo Convention on Rights and 
Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881. 
 127. Kenya Authorization Decision, supra note 87, ¶ 43 (dissenting opinion). 
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out legislative, judicial, executive, or other functions, is attributable 
to it. It does, however, highlight an important distinction made 
between the actions of private actors from those of State actors or 
organs pursuing an official policy. As a general rule, whereas State 
actors or organs may author a policy and can consequently be held 
responsible for it, the conduct of private actors is not generally 
attributable to a State. The uncontroversial exception would be if the 
private entity or actor is engaging in the wrongful conduct on the 
instructions of the State or under its influence, direction, or control.  
In Tadic, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY got the first 
opportunity to adapt and apply a general principle of State 
responsibility in the context of determinations of individual criminal 
responsibility. The judges confirmed that private action pursued in 
coordination with a State should be attributed to the State itself in 
order to be punishable.128 In that case, the Tribunal held that the 
crucial factor in determining whether paramilitary activities could be 
imputed to the State is whether the State is effectively in control of 
the group.129 This control can be demonstrated by evidence that the 
State not only equipped and financed the group, but also by whether 
it was instrumental in planning and coordinating the attacks.  
In other words, in circumstances where the State exercises overall 
control, the conduct of auxiliary bodies can be attributed to the 
State—even if they are private persons or entities formally separate 
and apart from it. It need not have ordered the attacks directly. 
Rather, the key element in Tadic appears to be, having regard to the 
factual circumstances in each case, whether there is overall State 
control over the policy of the group. If there is, then the group policy 
can rightly be considered to be the de facto policy of the State itself.  
The cases at the ICC seemed to mesh the requirements for a State 
policy with the requirements for an organizational policy, because of 
the belief that the latter would include organs of the State. Discussing 
 
 128. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 144 (July 15, 
1999), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf: 
[P]rivate individuals acting within the framework of, or in connection with, 
armed forces, or in collusion with State authorities may be regarded as de 
facto State organs. In these cases it follows that the acts of such individuals 
are attributed to the State, as far as State responsibility is concerned, and may 
also generate individual criminal responsibility. 
 129. Id. ¶ 131. 
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the requirements of an organizational policy, in Prosecutor v. 
Germain Katanga, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber held that an attack 
that is part of an organizational policy must be organized and follow 
a consistent pattern.130 In addition, the attack must be designed to 
promote a common policy that involves either public or private 
resources. Such a policy may be made either by groups of persons 
who govern a specific territory or, more crucially, by any 
organization with the capability to commit a widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population. On this view, the vital 
distinction between a State and organizational policy is whether 
either public or private resources are marshaled or used to implement 
it and the capability of the group in carrying it out. However, the 
reference to both public and private resources within the discussion 
of an organizational policy could also be read as affirming that a 
group can be characterized as an organization for the purposes of 
Article 7(2)(a) with or without the involvement of the State.  
Part of the ambiguity surrounding what constitutes a State or 
organizational policy seems to stem from the uncertainty over 
whether the discussion of its requirements is implicitly in reference 
to the level of connection that the organization must have with the 
State, or whether it surrounds the distinction between a State policy 
and an organizational policy, with States and organizations 
construed as entirely separate entities under the statute. Further 
complicating a coherent understanding of what amounts to a State 
policy under Rome Statute Article 7(2)(a) is the fact that the ICC has 
specified that State inaction amounting to willful blindness can be 
interpreted as effectively promoting a policy to commit crimes 
against humanity. The ICC’s Elements of Crimes specifies that a 
“policy to commit such an attack” requires that the State or 
organization actively promote or encourage such an attack against a 
civilian population.”131 In a footnote, this is further clarified by the 
statement that: 
[a] policy which has a civilian population as the object of the attack would 
 
 130. See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, 
Judgement, ¶ 396 (Sept. 30, 2008), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
doc571253.pdf. 
 131. Int’l Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, ICC-PIDS-LT-03-002/11, art. 7, 
¶ 3 (2011), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-
40EC-AD7B-45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf. 
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be implemented by State or organizational action. Such a policy may, in 
exceptional circumstances, be implemented by a deliberate failure to take 
action, which is consciously aimed at encouraging such attack. The 
existence of such a policy cannot be inferred solely from the absence of 
governmental or organizational action.132 
The failure of a State to take measures to stop crimes against 
humanity can be an important factor in evaluating whether a State or 
organizational policy exists. The rationale for this approach is most 
likely that the State is or would presumptively be aware of the 
existence of the prohibited acts amounting to crimes against 
humanity due to their organized, widespread, or systematic scale. 
This awareness of the perpetration of crimes makes the State 
complicit only if the intent behind the inaction is to further the 
attack, not if the State is unable to prevent it.  
Deliberate inaction could be a particularly relevant factor when 
evaluating the existence of crimes against humanity, especially if the 
State and the organization’s interests are interlinked. However, 
conclusively establishing that inaction is deliberate could be 
problematic. Something more than a failure to act is required. The 
implication is that the State or organization would somehow have a 
measure of knowledge and be connected to the entity as a way of 
encouraging the impugned conduct. All this adds to the uncertainty 
about the scope and limits of the ICC formulation of crimes against 
humanity.  
There is credible evidence in the status of customary international 
law leading up to the Rome Statute supporting the assertion that a 
group can pursue an organizational policy with no connection to the 
State whatsoever. In addition to the Kunarac case, and the 
questionable national case law cited within it, the ILC’s Draft Code 
anticipated that crimes against humanity can be pursued by purely 
private groups. Article 18 defined crimes against humanity as 
perpetration of enumerated acts constituting crimes against humanity 
“in a systematic manner or on a large scale and instigated or directed 
by a Government or any organization or group.” 
As discussed earlier, the commentary to Article 18 explicitly 
clarified that two conditions must be fulfilled for a prohibited act to 
 
 132. Id. art. 7, ¶ 3 n.6. 
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be deemed a crime against humanity. Firstly, it must be committed 
systematically (i.e., pursuant to a preconceived plan or policy) or, 
alternatively, on a large scale (meaning that the acts are directed 
against a multiplicity of victims). Secondly, it must be instigated or 
directed either by a government or “any organization or group.” 
There was no requirement that the organization be tied to the State 
whatsoever or that it should possess any specific (including State or 
State-like) characteristics. The ILC further explained that this 
condition was intended to exclude isolated or random violent acts 
carried out by a lone individual based on his own criminal plan 
toward his own criminal objective. In the result, it is the actual 
instigation or direction from a government or any organization or 
group, whether it is affiliated or unaffiliated to a government that 
makes the act an international crime imputable to private persons or 
agents of a State.133  
This suggests that, to the ILC, as for other scholars such as 
Professor Luban, it is the collective nature of the actors and their 
victims that is the defining feature of crimes against humanity.134 
That the Draft Code was adopted in 1996, three years after the 
Statute of the ICTY, which contained no explicit textual policy 
requirement but developed one jurisprudentially only to subsequently 
amend it, underscores the general inconsistency of the international 
bodies on the State or organizational policy requirement. This, 
therefore, necessitates a closer examination of the meaning of an 
organization in customary international law.  
 
 133. See Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 
supra note 80, art. 18, ¶ 5: 
The second condition requires that the act was “instigated or directed by a 
Government or by any organization or group.” The necessary instigation or 
direction may come from a Government or from an organization or a group. 
This alternative is intended to exclude the situation in which an individual 
commits an inhumane act while acting on his own initiative pursuant to his 
own criminal plan in the absence of any encouragement or direction from 
either a Government or a group or organization. This type of isolated criminal 
conduct on the part of a single individual would not constitute a crime against 
humanity. 
 134. David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE L.J. 85, 90 
(2004) (arguing that this represents “politics gone cancerous”). 
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C. THE MEANING OF “ORGANIZATION”  
AND “ORGANIZATIONAL POLICY” 
The concept of an “organization” and an “organizational policy” is 
clearly much broader than either a “State” or a “State policy.” Used 
in a loose way, a “State” could be considered an “organization,” and 
an “organization,” in the sense of its composite organs, could 
certainly be part of a “State.” This raises questions about the intent of 
the drafters of the Rome Statute in including both categories in 
Article 7(2)(a) and whether they should have offered answers to 
some of the questions that arose later by offering specific definitions 
for those terms. Since they did not, perhaps because it did not occur 
to the drafters or they wanted to leave those types of details to the 
Court’s judges, resolving some of the difficulties merits a brief 
review of the ordinary meaning of an organization and an 
organizational policy.  
Standard dictionary definitions of the term “organization” usually 
refer to an administrative or functional structure;135 a group of people 
sharing a particular purpose, “as in a business, a government 
department, a charity, etc.,”136 or a group of people who work 
together in a structured way for a shared purpose.137 This definition is 
suggestive of a modest and loose, rather than rigid and ordinary, 
standard of what an organization is. The crucial elements of the term 
appear to involve some type of group acting in pursuit of a common 
purpose and exhibiting some form of structure or hierarchy.  
Examining these elements in the context of the object and purpose 
of the Rome Statute, which according to the preamble includes 
ending impunity for international crimes while at the same time 
respecting State sovereignty and allowing the jurisdiction of national 
courts to have primacy, signifies a fairly broad scope to the term that 
perhaps better accords with the majority in the Kenya Authorization 
 
 135. See Organization, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/organization (last visited Oct. 2, 2012). 
 136. See Organization, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/ 
view/Entry/ 132452?redirectedFrom=organization#eid (last visited Oct. 1, 2012) 
[hereinafter OED Organization Definition]. 
 137. See Organization, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARIES ONLINE, 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/organization_1?q=organization 
(last visited Oct. 2, 2012). 
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decision.138 The fact that the 1998 draft of the Rome Statute did not 
include any type of explicit policy requirement in its definition of 
crimes against humanity also falls in line with this reasoning.139 
Largely relying on tribunal decisions that have endorsed the 
Kunarac tribunal’s rejection of the requirement of a policy or plan 
for crimes against humanity, the trend in the ICC prior to the Kenya 
decisions had been to focus on whether the organization had the 
capacity to commit a widespread and systematic attack on a civilian 
population. In Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Gomba, for example, the 
Court found that an organizational policy can be pursued by any 
groups “who govern a specific territory or by any organization with 
the capability to commit a widespread and systematic attack against a 
civilian population.”140 In the same vein, in Prosecutor v. Katanga, 
the judges held that an organizational policy may be pursued by “any 
group with the capability to commit a widespread or systematic 
attack against a civilian population.” These decisions seem to rely on 
the three generally accepted qualities of any organization, 
specifically that it consists of (1) a group (2) with a defined structure 
and (3) shared purpose.  
This reliance on the extensive international penal tribunal case law 
that has rejected the requirement that the organization have State-like 
qualities is understandable in light of the consistency of the ICTY 
and ICTR judgments following the Kunarac case. However, as I 
have argued earlier on in this article, and others have also done 
elsewhere, considering the ultimately shaky pillars upon which the 
Kunarac judgment rested, whether it reflects an international 
consensus as to the normative vision of crimes against humanity 
under customary international law remains open to question.  
Nevertheless, even if the concept is kept within the limitation that 
the organization involves a State-like structure, much like Professor 
Bassiouni has suggested in several of his publications, similar or new 
 
 138. See Rome Statute, supra note 86, pmbl. 
 139. See Preparatory Comm. on the Establishment of an Int’l Criminal Court, 
Rep. from the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court (Addendum) art. 5, June 15–17, 
1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/2/Add.1 (Apr. 14, 1998). 
 140. Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, 
Decision on the Confirmation of the Charges, ¶ 81 (June 15, 2009) (stating that 
these types of widespread or systematic attacks exhibit a regular pattern). 
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questions would still arise. Whether a tribe, for example, is a 
sufficiently State-like structure to constitute an organization within 
the meaning of Article 7(2)(a) is open to debate. Considering that a 
tribe is more akin to a group and does not necessarily have the legal 
capacity to enter into formal relations with other States, and that it 
may or may not be organized into a “recognizable government,” it 
would at first blush seem that a tribe would potentially not have 
some of the legally recognized characteristics of a State as defined 
by, for example, the Restatement on Foreign Relations Law. 
However, many tribes would almost certainly fall within the ordinary 
customary international law understanding of an organization, body, 
or group with State-like characteristics, as they can be entities with a 
permanent population, occupying a specific territory, and having 
their own internal government.  
Similarly, once denuded of its Euro-centric underpinnings, it is 
apparent that tribes or ethnic groupings in Africa or other parts of the 
world usually have the ability to enter into relations with other tribes 
or groups that may or may not also occupy a specific geographic area 
or have control over it. Thus, a case can be made that, at least certain 
types of tribes, bear a sufficient degree of “organization” to 
constitute State-like entities, even if they do not meet the classical 
customary international law definition of a State. Regardless of how 
State-like or un-State-like a tribe is, the potential that you have a 
group that will be capable of committing atrocities against civilians 
without international accountability still remains. 
This difficulty is apparent in the Muthaura decision. The 
majority’s conclusion that the evidence provided a reasonable basis 
to believe that the ethnicity-based group Mungiki constituted an 
organization within the meaning of Article 7(2)(a) was based on a 
finding that the group operated within a large and complex 
hierarchical structure featuring various levels of command, and that 
obedience within the group was achieved through strict disciplinary 
measures. In addition, the majority found that the group employed a 
trained militant wing that it used to carry out violent operations and 
to sustain power over many societal activities in and around 
Nairobi.141 This was sufficient to satisfy the criteria the judges had 
 
 141. See Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for Summonses to Appear ¶ 22 (Mar. 8, 2011), 
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provided in the Kenya Authorization decision that the group exist 
within an established hierarchy under a responsible command, 
possess the means to carry out a widespread or systematic attack on a 
civilian population, have a criminal objective as a primary purpose, 
and articulate either implicitly or explicitly an intention to attack a 
civilian population, amongst other things.142 On this approach, the 
group should qualify as sufficiently organized to fall within the 
parameters of crimes against humanity, as understood on its plain 
meaning in Article 7(2) of the Rome Statute. 
This argument would appear consistent with the views of other 
scholars, like Professor Robinson, who has offered a compelling 
theoretical defense for the majority decision by advocating for a 
“modest standard” for “organization.” In his view, “[a]s long as there 
is some organized entity directing, instigating or encouraging crimes, 
then we are no longer confronted with mere spontaneous ‘crime 
waves’ and unconnected acts of individual wrongdoing.”143 That is to 
say, excluding random acts, it does not so much matter which type of 
public or even private organization is carrying out the crimes in 
question. A similar position has been advanced by Professor Leila 
Sadat, a leading scholar, regarding the concomitant policy 
 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/D99DEB2B-E48B-4942-8546-515B792F2297 
.htm. The Court relied on evidence that: 
the Mungiki (i) control and provide social services such as electricity, water 
and sanitation; (ii) administer criminal justice through local chairmen who act 
as judges in their communities; and (iii) control the transport sector and other 
business activities, where they provide informal employment for members. 
The material shows that to support such activities, the Mungiki collect 
informal taxes in the areas under their control. In light of the foregoing, the 
Chamber is of the opinion that the material submitted provides reasonable 
grounds to believe that the Mungiki qualify as an organization within the 
meaning and for the purposes of article 7(2) (a) of the Statute. 
 142. See Kenya Authorization Decision, supra note 87, ¶ 93. The considerations 
that the majority specified in their entirety were whether: 
(i) the group is under a responsible command, or has an established hierarchy; 
(ii) whether the group possesses, in fact, the means to carry out a widespread 
or systematic attack against a civilian population; (iii) whether the group 
exercises control over part of the territory of a State; (iv) whether the group 
has criminal activities against the civilian population as a primary purpose; 
(v) whether the group articulates, explicitly or implicitly, an intention to 
attack a civilian population; (vi) whether the group is part of a larger group, 
which fulfills some or all of the above mentioned criteria. 
 143. See Robinson, Essence of Crimes Against Humanity Raised at ICC, supra 
note 7. 
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requirement, that “[w]hile the policy element is clearly part of the 
ICC Statute, overemphasis on its application will result in limiting 
the scope and applicability of [crimes against humanity] so severely 
that it becomes, like genocide, a crime so difficult to prove that its 
overall utility becomes severely limited.”144  
It follows that, if readers accept Robinson’s and Sadat’s proposals, 
as I do, we would confer greater interpretative flexibility to the ICC 
judges by lowering the threshold of what constitutes an organization 
as far down as possible, in the same way that we would lower the 
threshold required to find that a policy is in place. In this way, we 
make large-scale and systematic crimes that take place in a wide 
variety of situations deserving of international investigation and 
prosecution if the concerned State fails to act or is unwilling or 
unable to do so. I endorse this view, especially keeping in mind the 
remarks about the crucial role of this residual category of 
international crime and the importance of extending prosecutions to 
non-State actors for human security reasons in a jus post bellum–
conscious world. Even Professor Bassiouni, who seemingly opposes 
the extension of Article 7(2)(a) to non-State actors, appears to accept, 
in his most recent work, that the Rome Statute could expand crimes 
against humanity to explicitly cover non-State actors, presumably 
even if they are not possessing the traditional State or State-like 
organizational characteristics, through “its future jurisprudence.”145  
The irony of the debate at the ICC is that, even using Judge Kaul’s 
preferred criteria, it could be argued that the Mungiki constitutes an 
organization for the purposes of Article 7. This would ordinarily be 
the case, but it is particularly so in the circumstances of the low 
reasonable basis to believe evidentiary threshold applicable at the 
authorization to investigate stage.146 In his dissenting opinion, Judge 
Kaul argued that organization for the purposes of Article 7(2)(a) 
must include a collectivity of persons, acting with a common 
 
 144. See Sadat, supra note 4, at 90. 
 145. BASSIOUNI, supra note 70, at 42. 
 146. See Rome Statute, supra note 86, art. 15(3): 
If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with 
an investigation, he or she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request 
for authorization of an investigation, together with any supporting material 
collected. Victims may make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. 
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purpose, and having a responsible command or hierarchical structure 
that includes some kind of policy-making level. The capacity to 
impose the policy on its members and to sanction was also necessary, 
as was the organization’s ability to attack a civilian population on a 
large scale and its existence for a prolonged time period.147 
The Mungiki seems to be a collectivity of persons, acting with a 
common purpose. Considering that the evidence suggested that it 
was a large criminal organization with the capacity to impose taxes 
in a geographic area within its control, as well as the power to 
sanction its members, it would seem, contrary to Judge Kaul’s 
conclusion in the Kenya Authorization decision, that some type of 
hierarchy can be presumed. Of course, this determination would 
partly depend on exactly how the Mungiki is able to sanction its 
members—evidence that will likely come out during the course of 
the trials in the Kenya cases. While definitive conclusions cannot be 
drawn until then, threats of or actual use of force, in a militia like 
that, would appear integral to the ability to sanction. These modes of 
discipline should not be discarded lightly, especially if the fear of 
extreme violence or perhaps even loss of life to self or family 
members living in a particular community is sufficient to bring 
members back in line.  
A hierarchy signifies a body of persons ranked in a specific 
order.148 But if the Mungiki’s ability to sanction stems from a shared 
power structure in which each member has equal authority, then 
there is a potential argument that the organization is not 
appropriately characterized as existing within a hierarchy, or even 
under a responsible command. However, if the ability to sanction 
involves a more complex chain of command, as the majority opinion 
seems to have found, or even if it stems from one central authority 
figure that is in effective control of the entire group, then the 
evidence would more strongly support the conclusion that the 
Mungiki are properly classified as an organization, according to 
 
 147. See Kenya Authorization Decision, supra note 87, ¶ 51 (dissenting opinion) 
(emphasizing that only non-State actors with a State-like nature can satisfy the 
requirement of an organization within the meaning of Article 7(2)(a)). 
 148. See OED Organization Definition, supra note 136 (defining a hierarchy as 
a “body of persons or things ranked in grades, orders, or classes, one above 
another; spec. in Natural Science and Logic, a system or series of terms of 
successive rank (as classes, orders, genera, species, etc.), used in classification”). 
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Judge Kaul’s own criteria.  
Similarly, the ability to sanction need not be formal to imply a 
relatively complex hierarchy, which in turn would suggest that the 
group has been in existence for at least a period of time and most 
likely has the capacity to attack a civilian population on a large scale. 
There is certainly general information confirming the long-term 
existence of ethnicity-based militia in Kenya, such as the Mungiki, 
and certainly in other African countries. This most famously includes 
the Interhamwe, who played a crucial role in the 1994 genocide in 
Rwanda as well. Indeed, even the ability to pursue a policy seems to 
imply the existence of a basic form of organization, and any 
organized collective group action can potentially be characterized as 
constituting a policy, as the Tadic case made clear.149 Both sets of 
criteria seem somewhat redundant, then, perhaps showing that 
attempting to provide greater detail in the definition of an 
organization can also obscure its meaning. 
The point is that all these terms seem highly malleable, leaving the 
status of what constitutes an organization capable of committing 
crimes against humanity under the Rome Statute unclear. This lack 
of clarity, combined with the sheer number of situations that could 
fall within ICC jurisdiction, in effect gives the prosecutor and the 
judges the not-so-easy task of evaluating, on a case-by-case basis, the 
features that make a collectivity of persons an organizational group 
for the purposes of committing crimes against humanity.  
It also suggests that there has to be a measure of discretion in 
evaluating whether particular entities are appropriately characterized 
as organizations or the degree to which their activities need to be 
organized, and the extent to which their attacks should be widespread 
or systematic to fall within the scope of crimes against humanity. In 
any such assessments, the focus of the analysis should more 
appropriately hone in on the wrongful conduct that has caused 
international social harm or alarm and whether the members of the 
group have the means to commit a widespread and systematic attack 
 
 149. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 653 (Int’l Crim. 
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-
bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=4027812b4 (holding that “[i]f the acts occur 
on a widespread or systematic basis that demonstrates a policy to commit those 
acts, whether formalized or not”). 
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on civilians, rather than on the proper appellation to be given to the 
organization in the sense of how State-like or un-State-like its 
qualities are. In an interesting way, it reminds one of the feckless 
distinction (from a human-life-protection point of view) between 
international and non-international armed conflict in international 
humanitarian law, where the evolution of the two separate regimes 
justified, in the former not the latter, the prosecution of those who 
committed grave breaches. It took international judicial intervention, 
in the ICTY, to render that distinction nugatory.  
Similarly, we should not be wedded to the concept of which type 
of State or non-State organization is committing massive crimes 
against innocent civilians; rather, we should try to broaden the justice 
net and bring such entities to international prosecutions to send the 
symbolic message that their depredations are totally unacceptable not 
just to one society, but to all of human society.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Considering the ambiguity surrounding the definition of crimes 
against humanity in customary international law leading up to the 
Rome Conference, and the incorporation of a version of the offense 
retaining a State or organizational policy requirement as codified in 
Article 7, the most effective reformulation of the concept would be 
through an amendment to the Rome Statute.  
There are several advantages to this solution, only a few of which 
can be highlighted here. First, it allows for a more principled 
approach to the development of international criminal law. The 
difficulty judges have had in the ICTR, ICTY, and ICC with 
reconciling inconsistent and unsupported assessments of the 
requirements of crimes against humanity under customary 
international law and their particular instruments demonstrate the 
necessity of a clearer international stance on the issue. While there 
will always be some degree of ambiguity in the language used, and 
therefore the felt need for a certain level of judicial discretion in 
defining the exact contours of crimes against humanity (and other 
international crimes for that matter), the recent decisions of the ICC 
in response to the post-election violence in Kenya reveals deep 
confusion in the Rome Statute definition. This uncertainty, which 
was a product of the lack of normative consensus on what exactly is 
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the essential rationale and outer boundary of the offense, has led to 
inconsistent analysis among judges, scholars, and practitioners.  
Most recently, this inconsistency has resulted in the creation of 
fuzzy criteria for evaluating the requirements of an organization 
within the meaning of Article 7 of the Rome Statute by both the 
majority and dissenting opinions in the Kenya Authorization and 
summonses decisions. Even though they reach opposite conclusions 
regarding the exact character of an organization, both the majority 
and the dissent have offered indefinite criteria that seem open to 
wide interpretation. A close examination of both sets of criteria leads 
to a linguistic quagmire that does little to help resolve the underlying 
question of what exactly ought to be the primary justification for 
crimes against humanity. 
In some respects, stepping back to frame a bigger picture, the 
confusion and ambiguity may be viewed as the natural evolutionary 
process of customary international law, in which the judiciary’s role 
is to expand or restrict the definition or role of crimes against 
humanity according to shifting objectives of the Court and its States 
Parties. However, the persistence of the controversy over the State or 
organizational policy requirement since Nuremberg, and the lack of 
conclusion that influential and seemingly definitive assessments like 
the Kunarac judgment provided, demonstrate that any judicial stance 
on the issue will be open to further attack. To avoid potentially 
unproductive and endless judicial and academic debates on the issue, 
the Rome Statute needs to be amended. This will be particularly 
helpful in the early years of the ICC by providing a solid position on 
the proper role and function of the permanent tribunal in what seems 
to be the beginning stage of the era of international criminal justice. 
Second, change through an amendment to the Rome Statute 
provides for a more coherent and more consistent development of the 
law. In so doing, the advantages and potential repercussions of a 
policy shift can be thoroughly examined by parties both for and 
against the State or organizational policy requirement. Although this 
examination of the implications of the alleged expansion of the 
ICC’s jurisdiction has been occurring among the dissenting voices in 
the judiciary and academia, an amendment to the Rome Statute 
allows for a more democratic, more participatory, more deliberative, 
and ultimately more principled legal process involving the States 
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Parties that have the ultimate responsibility to give effect to them 
through national prosecutions.  
Third, it will also recognize the kind of separation of powers 
implicit in national and international law between judges, as 
interpreters of the law, and States, as legislators of the body of law 
that they apply. A settled agreement on the meaning of the State or 
organizational policy requirement will be especially helpful in 
situations such as that which occurred following the post-election 
violence in Kenya, where the evidence appears to, at least initially, 
fail to clearly demonstrate either the existence or absence of a State 
policy to commit crimes against humanity. That decision 
demonstrated that establishing an evidentiary link between State 
actors and a policy on the part of the State will often be difficult, 
problematic, and in some permutations that might arise in the future, 
perhaps even impossible. The police force, for example, was 
implicated in the Kenyan post-election violence. However, whether 
the police were acting at the instigation or under the direction of the 
State or its organs, or whether they were acting independently as 
hired guns for politicians acting for private purposes, or even worse 
in cahoots with militia organizations for ethnic reasons, seems to be 
unsettled.  
An amendment to the Rome Statute would help provide guidance 
in future situations such as Kenya’s by requiring an international 
consensus on whether a policy should be required for a finding that 
crimes against humanity had occurred and, if so and more 
importantly, what type of policy should be required and from whom. 
Additionally, the controversy occasioned by the willingness of the 
majority in the Kenya Authorization decision to interpret broadly the 
threshold of crimes against humanity to possibly encompass purely 
private and loosely constituted and amorphous groups underscores 
the need for a clear statutory definition of an “organization” and 
“organizational policy.”150 In other words, to enhance clarity, it may 
be necessary to assign specific meanings to those terms to address 
the predicate question of the nature, type, and characteristics of the 
entity that will be deemed capable of adopting and implementing a 
policy that could then be said to have crossed the borderline into the 
prohibited criminal conduct against all of humanity. 
 
 150. Jalloh, supra note 16. 
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Of course, from the emerging jus post bellum perspective, which 
takes the imposition of punishment and retribution for leaders who 
oversee violence during conflict as a desirable goal to advance 
human rights and a just and sustainable peace, an interpretation of 
the Rome Statute that widens the scope of crimes against humanity 
to consciously include non-State actors is the most appropriate 
course for the ICC to take in the future. There is support for that in 
the ad hoc tribunal jurisprudence, which, with the best of intentions, 
effectively sought but unfortunately failed to do away with the State 
policy requirement before the permanent court was created.  
Still, it is submitted that a change in the policy of the ICC on this 
scale would be contentious if undertaken by judges alone, as opposed 
to by legislators (i.e., States Parties), considering the principles of 
free consent and the multilateral treaty basis of the Rome Statute and 
international law more generally. As the concept is sufficiently broad 
to potentially apply to a nearly unlimited quantity of crimes, an 
international normative and legislative consensus on both the 
purpose of crimes against humanity in the Court’s jurisprudence, and 
the most appropriate method of accomplishing its prohibitions, 
would arguably provide a more legally and more politically 
acceptable solution to the controversy. Yet it can already be deduced 
from the definitions of crimes against humanity that date back to 
Nuremberg that the international community condemns widespread 
or systematic human rights violations against unarmed civilians. The 
prospects for the extension of the concept therefore seem to be in 
favor of those wanting for the regime to explicitly cover non-State 
actors instead of those who oppose such a change. 
While there are strong arguments both for and against an 
expansion in the ICC’s jurisdiction over other modern gross violators 
of human rights, such as terrorist groups, the issue is unlikely to be 
effectively addressed by the judiciary. This is because the lack of 
consensus on the meaning of terrorism would likely make any 
judicial approach to bringing single massive terroristic events into 
the crimes against humanity fold highly controversial. But, in a 
security-conscious world, we may appropriately engage the policy 
debate whether crimes against humanity should be extended to apply 
to groups or other actors whose modus operandi may today place 
them at the borderline or the periphery of the offense without 
crossing the threshold into its prohibitions because of a strict 
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interpretation of the State or organizational policy requirement.  
Thus, for instance, we may discuss the propriety of broadening the 
boundary of crimes against humanity to include single but 
devastating incidents such as the August 1998 Nairobi bombings in 
Kenya; the New York City bombings of September 11, 2001, in the 
United States; the March 2004 Madrid bombings in Spain; the July 
2005 London bombings in England; the July 2011 Mumbai 
bombings in India. We might consider whether to qualify some or 
more of these acts as crimes against all of humanity rather than 
crimes of particular interest only to the directly affected countries. 
The amendment process would provide the right forum for this 
debate because it creates the space for potentially achieving a general 
international agreement for definitive inclusion or exclusion of such 
one-off but massive criminal events and whether to make them a 
shared responsibility for the ICC and its States Parties to prosecute 
should they occur elsewhere in the future.  
Fourth, a coherent and balanced approach to a new definition of 
crimes against humanity will allow for a reasoned policy shift on the 
part of the ICC. The fluidity of crimes against humanity under 
customary international law shows that its definition in the Rome 
Statute is more appropriately viewed as a policy choice on the part of 
the ICC negotiators, rather than a codification of an accepted 
understanding of the crime under international law. The fact that the 
formulation of crimes against humanity is fundamentally a policy 
decision demonstrates that it is more appropriate to acknowledge its 
political implications in the amendment process, rather than to 
attempt to shift its intended meaning through judicially led change 
with all its attendant push back risks for the fledgling tribunal. By 
simultaneously acknowledging that the law regarding crimes against 
humanity is necessarily in a state of change, rather than being settled, 
while requiring an international consensus to legitimize that change, 
the Court will stay rooted in the treaty framework in which it was 
originally envisioned. In that way, it will be more effective in its 
loftily stated mandate in the preamble of its statute about helping put 
an end to the culture of impunity.  
In fact, the very high threshold of consensus, or two-thirds vote, 
required to pass an amendment in Article 121 of the ICC statute 
ensures that a degree of widespread agreement is reached such that it 
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may be legitimately claimed afterwards that the position collectively 
taken by the States Parties indicates a customary international law 
definition of crimes against humanity. This will, in turn, pay 
dividends because it would decrease the likelihood that, in 
implementing obligations of the Rome Statute, national jurisdictions 
would choose to go one way or the other on the State or 
organizational policy issue.  
Finally, moving well beyond the restrictive debates about 
definitions of crimes against humanity in the ICC in particular, 
which have been the limited focus of this article, perhaps the answer 
to the problem of how to re-characterize crimes against humanity 
may even lie elsewhere in legal philosophy. For example, Professor 
May has offered what he called the security and international harm 
principles as the essential justifications for crimes against 
humanity.151 In his view, under the security principle, a State’s 
involvement in perpetrating crimes against its own citizens acts as a 
basis for other concerned States to step in to protect the victims or 
offer them remedies for their harms.152 This argument resonates with 
some of the errant State rationales modern governments have given 
for the establishment of international tribunals. It is also consistent 
with the direction that the international community is headed with 
the widespread endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect 
doctrine. Under the international harm principle that May offers, 
abuses directed against a group are the types of harms that serve to 
demarcate the cases deserving of international prosecutions versus 
those requiring domestic action.153 
Although May’s first principle returns the spotlight to State action, 
the practical application of which was never in issue even under the 
current definition in Article 7 of the Rome Statute, the second does 
not necessarily do so. Rather, it focuses on the protection of groups, 
which going by the existence of the Genocide Convention, have been 
of interest since at least 1948 as requiring the collective protection of 
the international community as a whole. It therefore offers what 
 
 151. MAY, supra note 16, at 12, 21 (detailing the two main reasons people may 
oppose trials by international tribunals: they violate the rights of States and they 
fail to be tolerant of diverse State practices). 
 152. Id. at 21 (stating that the security principle is essentially a limit on State 
sovereignty). 
 153. Id. at 12, 21. 
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might be termed a new way of thinking about a principled 
justification for a specific international crime. Indeed, it appears self-
evident that a retooling of the crimes against humanity standard in 
the Rome Statute would, under May’s international harm principle, 
place the focus not so much on the character of the entity developing 
the policy and implementing it (whether State, State-like, 
organization, or organization-like), the problem we encounter under 
the current scheme, but rather the character of the wrongful conduct 
or harm visited on the victims that would trigger collective action not 
just by one State but by the community of States through 
investigation, prosecution, and punishment through the ICC and 
universal jurisdiction. 
Keeping in mind such a theory, while not by itself sufficient to 
resolve the specific question considered in this article, does help to 
advance the conversation for States on what purpose an international 
offense like crimes against humanity should serve for them and the 
rest of humanity as human rights moves more and more to the center 
stage in shaping global responses to international insecurity. 
 
